Abstract: Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) create value for economic development, but face significant obstacles due to funding shortages in their operations. SMEs have difficulty obtaining financing loans directly from commercial banks due to their lower credit ratings, poor financial compliance, and inadequate cash flow. As a result, they face challenges of expensive and difficult financing. However, equity financing is one of the important ways to help SMEs solve financing difficulties. Nevertheless, due to the relatively low regulatory requirements and incomplete financial disclosures of SMEs, fraudulent behavior can occur in order to increase valuation levels. For independent third-party investment institutions, it is difficult for them to correctly assess the valuation of SMEs due to information asymmetry and industry investment barriers, leading to financing failures. In contrast, as a member enterprise in the supply chain, the supplier is familiar with the overall industry situation. Moreover, the retailer and supplier have close business transactions, and the supplier is more likely to know the production and operation situation of SMEs. If the supplier, as the core enterprise, provides internal equity investment to the retailer with funding constraints, it can effectively avoid a series of problems caused by information asymmetry in the traditional private equity financing market. In addition, whether the investor holds the decision-making power of the enterprise after the internal equity financing in the supply chain is also a problem that needs further consideration and discussion. Generally, investors can influence the enterprise's decision-making process through adding “earn-out clauses” during the financing process. The content of the earn-out clauses can be financial indicators such as net profit margin, or non-financial indicators such as market share and user growth. In this paper, the supplier as an investor can determine the level of effort for the retailer to expand the market, which meets the non-financial performance agreement. In summary, the research questions in this paper include: 1)The impact of internal equity financing in the supply chain on the optimal operational decision-making and profits of the retailer and the supplier, namely, whether the retailer will choose financing and in which mode the financing will be reached; 2)After internal equity financing in the supply chain, what is the impact of the retailer's or supplier's control over the decision-making power of market development on the profits of both sides?
The present study investigates a two-tier supply chain system consisting of one supplier and one retailer. The retailer is a financially constrained SME, while the supplier is a financially rich core enterprise. Based on this, a supplier-led Stackelberg game model is established. Under three scenarios of no equity financing, retailer control (R mode), and supplier control (S mode), the optimal decision-making behavior and profit situation of both parties are discussed and analyzed. Furthermore, by comparing and analyzing different financing scenarios, and the following conclusions are drawn:
i)Compared with no internal equity financing in the supply chain, using the R mode of financing will increase the supplier's profit, but the retailer's profit may not necessarily increase, depending on the company's growth potential. If the retailer has high growth potential, using internal equity financing in the supply chain under the R mode can indeed increase its profit. However, if the retailer has low growth potential and blindly pursues financing and market expansion, it may actually decrease the retailer's profit.
ii)Compared with no internal equity financing in the supply chain, using the S mode of financing will also increase the supplier's profit, but the retailer's profit will decrease. At the same time, under the S mode, the supplier will reduce the wholesale price of the product and expand the market by setting a higher effort level. Therefore, if the retailer is in a highly competitive industry, the retailer can consider sacrificing short-term profits, accepting the supplier's investment, and helping the company gain a competitive advantage.
iii)Through a comprehensive comparative analysis of the profits of the retailer and supplier under the three scenarios of no equity financing, R mode, and S mode, we find that: Firstly, both parties can obtain higher profits by controlling the decision-making power to expand the market. However, even if the retailer has decision-making power, its profit will still be lower than the pre-financing level when the growth potential is low. Secondly, in order to expand sales channels and obtain higher profits, suppliers are typically motivated to provide equity financing to downstream retailers who face limited capital. Thirdly, the key factor affecting whether the retailer will carry out internal equity financing in the supply chain and which financing mode the two parties will use for cooperation is the retailer's growth potential. This means that if the growth potential is low, the retailer should reject the financing. If the growth potential is moderate or high, the retailer and investor will reach a financing agreement under the R mode.

Key words: supply chain management, financing decision, small and medium-sized enterprises, equity financing

摘要： 供应链下游的中小型零售商在发展过程中通常面临着资金短缺的问题。作为供应链的核心企业,供应商可以通过提供供应链内部的股权投资来帮助下游企业扩大市场份额,并从中获得更高的利润回报。本文构建了一个两级供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,考虑了资金有限的零售商和资金充裕的供应商之间的博弈情况。在不同的内部股权融资情况下,包括无股权融资、零售商具有开拓市场决策权(R模式)和供应商具有开拓市场决策权(S模式),研究了供应链各成员的最优决策和利润。我们发现:首先,作为中小企业的零售商引入供应链内部股权融资后不一定会增加利润。当零售商的成长性较低时,盲目引入股权融资可能会降低其利润。其次,供应商为下游中小企业提供股权融资可以提高自身的利润。最后,当零售商的成长性较高时,投融双方通常会采用零售商具有开拓市场控制权(R模式)的股权融资方式来达成合作。

关键词: 供应链管理, 融资决策, 中小企业, 股权融资