Abstract: How to govern the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises is an important issue to prevent and defuse systemic financial risks in China. However, for many major shareholders, as a relatively popular shareholding structure in corporate governance, there has been no literature to examine its impact on the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises. Therefore, it is of good practical significance to reveal the role of the equity structure in the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises and to provide a theoretical reference for further optimizing the shareholding structure in the governance of shadow banking risks.
Based on this, this paper selects the sample data of China’s A-share non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2019, establishes a linear model, and uses stata15 to empirically test the influence and function mechanism of multiple major shareholders on the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises. Among them, the data of many major shareholders are manually sorted, while the shadow banking data come from Guotai’ian database and the annual report of listed companies. The study has found that the shareholding structure of many major shareholders has significantly promoted the shadow banking behavior of non-financial enterprises. Through the mechanism inspection, it is found that due to the existence of the coordination cost, the supervision of many major shareholders over the management has failed, increasing the first type of agency problem, thus promoting the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises. Further research shows that in the sample group with low media attention, low non-shareholding ratio of state-owned enterprises and institutional investors, low regional legal environment and low development degree of digital financial development, many large shareholders have a more obvious role in promoting the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises.
The research conclusion of this paper is of practical value: First, it actively optimizes the shareholding structure of non-financial enterprises to avoid decision-making mistakes caused by excessive concentration of equity, prevent excessive coordination costs among multiple major shareholders, reduce information asymmetry and agency problems, and restrain the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises. Secondly, we give full play to the inhibitory role of the two external supervision mechanisms of media attention and institutional investors on the positive relationship between the shadow banking of multiple major shareholders and non-financial enterprises. Finally, we actively improve the regional legal environment, give full play to the positive role of digital finance, and focus on the shadow banking business scale of non-state-owned enterprises.

Key words: shadow banking, information asymmetry, multiple major shareholders, coordination cost

摘要： 本文选取2007~2019年我国A股非金融上市公司的样本数据,实证检验了多个大股东对非金融企业影子银行化的影响及作用机制。研究发现,多个大股东的股权结构显著促进了非金融企业影子银行化行为。机制检验表明,由于协调成本的存在,导致多个大股东对管理层的监督失效,增加了第一类代理问题,进而促进了非金融企业影子银行化。进一步研究表明,在媒体关注度较低、非国有企业、机构投资者持股比例较低、地区法律环境较差以及数字金融发展程度较低的样本组中,多个大股东对非金融企业影子银行化的促进作用表现更明显。

关键词: 影子银行化, 信息不对称, 多个大股东, 协调成本