Abstract: Benefiting from the development of remanufacturing technology and the introduction of government subsidies or carbon tax policies, manufacturers take back used products to produce remanufactured products in closed-loop supply chains. However, collecting used products and remanufacturing allow manufacturers to participate in sustainable operations, but they are not core businesses for many manufacturers, and outsourcing them to professional third-party remanufacturers (3PRs) can be a strategic option. Therefore, in reality a manufacturer has two third-party remanufacturing modes, outsourcing (O) and authorization (A). Mode O entails the manufacturer outsourcing only the remanufacturing process to the 3PR. For example, Land Rover and Caterpillar have an agreement whereby Caterpillar Remanufacturing Services (CRS) acts as Land Rover’s lead global remanufacturing services provider. Land Rover outsources the remanufacturing operations to CRS and sells both new and remanufactured products to consumers. While in mode A, the manufacturer licenses both the remanufacturing process and the sales operations of remanufactured products to the 3PR. For example, Apple which has an agreement with Foxconn in which the latter acquires the proprietary rights to remanufacture used iPhones, and then places them back as new phones in the Chinese market.
To facilitate remanufacturing by these two types of third-party remanufacturing modes, many countries have carried out financial subsidy or carbon tax on remanufacturing process. Based on it, this paper aims to discuss which third-party remanufacturing mode is optimal for a manufacturer, and to examine the impacts of behavioral characteristics and government’s subsidies or carbon taxes on the optimal mode. To achieve the above aim, this paper constructs a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one retailer and one 3PR. The manufacturer is the leader and chooses the outsourcing or authorization mode.
This paper mainly gets the following management insights: (1)Under mode O, although the 3PR’s profit is small with the subsidy mechanism, it is effective for increasing the retailer’s profit. The 3PR will not participate in remanufacturing because it is unprofitable with the carbon tax mechanism. (2)Under mode A, both the manufacturer and the 3PR have the largest profits with the subsidy mechanism, but both the retailer and government profit less. When the government adopts the carbon tax mechanism, firms and the government are in the situation of multi-win.
Several directions could be taken in future research. One may investigate the effect of competition between two homogeneous manufacturers. Other directions include consideration of dual channel collection and the existence of a green consumer segment (primary and green consumers) to facilitate the investigation of sustainability or considering how these factors affect the third-party remanufacturing strategy selection.

Key words: remanufacturing, third-party remanufacturing mode, government’s subsidies or carbon taxes, green consumption, game theory

摘要： 现实中,各国政府对再制造产品的生产进行财政补贴或征收碳税。基于此,本文构建了由单一制造商、零售商和第三方再制造商组成的闭环供应链,制造商是领导者并选择外包或授权模式,分析政府补贴/碳税机制对闭环供应链决策、第三方再制造模式选择、消费者剩余和社会福利的影响。研究发现:(1)在外包模式下,虽然第三方再制造商在政府采取补贴机制时利润很少,但补贴机制有效地增加了零售商的利润;第三方再制造商在政府采取碳税机制时无利可图,不会参与再制造。(2)在授权模式下,制造商在政府采取补贴机制时利润最大,且此时与第三方再制造商是一种双赢的状态,但零售商和政府均受益较小;在政府采取碳税机制时,闭环供应链各成员和政府能达到多赢的局面。

关键词: 再制造, 第三方再制造模式, 政府补贴/碳税, 绿色消费, 博弈论