Abstract: The characteristics of quasi-public goods of general purpose technologies determine that their R&D has the characteristics of long period, continuous input, knowledge spillover and income uncertainty, etc., which make general purpose technologies easy to fall into failure dilemmas of insufficient R&D, and cross-organizational cooperation becomes an important organization mode to alleviate the failure dilemmas of general purpose technologies R&D. The previous researches have confirmed the effectiveness of general purpose technologies cooperative R&D using empirical and modeling methods, but there has been little focus on the impact on benefit distribution and payment structures. Therefore, with the support of information technology, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the dynamic game and payment structure selection among participants in the cross-organizational cooperative R&D for general purpose technologies.
This paper introduces a cost payment structure where R&D effort levels can be monitored with information technology support, categorizing general purpose technologies cross-organizational R&D scenarios into output-oriented and process-oriented ones. By establishing a differential game model involving leading enterprises, universities and research institutes, and the government, the paper comparatively analyzes the optimal decisions of leading enterprises and universities and research institutes, the R&D system benefits, and the optimal government support strategies under the two R&D scenarios, and explores the selection of two R&D scenarios and their influencing factors. The research results show that: (1)Under both R&D scenarios, when the incremental elasticity of output is small (large), the R&D effort levels and benefit impact coefficients of leading enterprises and universities/research institutes will be positively (negatively) correlated with each other, and negatively (positively) correlated with their R&D effort cost coefficients and technology obsolescence rates, with a similar impact from monitoring costs; when the benefit impact coefficient is large (small), the R&D effort levels of both parties will be positively (negatively) correlated with the output elasticity and its increment. (2)When the incremental elasticity of output is small, the R&D effort levels and R&D benefits in the output-oriented scenario will be greater than those in the process-oriented scenario, otherwise, the ratio of monitoring costs to the effort cost coefficient of universities/research institutes will need to be considered. (3)In the output-oriented scenario, the cost subsidy coefficient is equal to the profit distribution coefficient between the cooperating parties, while in the process-oriented scenario, the government does not need to provide cost subsidies; when the incremental elasticity of output is small or large, the government's benefits will be higher in the output-oriented scenario, otherwise, the government will benefit more in the process-oriented scenario.
The main contributions in this paper are: (1)Establishing a differential game model for cross-organizational cooperative R&D of general purpose technologies involving leading enterprises, universities and research institutes, and the government. (2)Designing output-oriented and process-oriented payment structures with the support of information technology, and advancing research on process-oriented cross-organizational cooperative R&D of general purpose technologies. (3)Conducting an analysis of the two scenarios with examples, and analyzing the impact of different payment structures on the optimal decisions and benefits of leading enterprises and universities/research institutes, so as to enrich research into the field of general purpose technologies R&D. Future extensions of this work will include exploring diversified government support mechanisms to play the enabling role of information technology to general purpose technology breakthroughs, and addressing the challenge of achieving horizontal joint efforts in supply and diffusion stages and vertical integration from supply to diffusion in cross-organizational cooperative R&D.

Key words: general purpose technologies, cross-organizational cooperative R&D, information technology support, differential game

摘要： 引入信息技术支持,将龙头企业、高校院所及政府构成的共性技术跨组织合作研发分为产出导向与过程导向情形,运用微分博弈分析两种情形下主体决策、收益及影响因素。研究发现:两种情形下产出弹性增量较小(大)时,龙头企业与高校院所研发努力水平与收益系数正(负)相关,与双方努力成本系数及技术淘汰率负(正)相关,监控成本的影响与此类似;收益系数较大(小)时,双方努力水平与产出弹性及其增量正(负)相关;产出弹性增量较小时,双方努力水平和研发收益在产出导向情形更大,反之需考虑监控成本与高校院所努力成本系数的比值;成本补贴系数在过程导向情形下更小,当产出弹性增量较小或较大时政府收益在产出导向情形下更高,否则过程导向情形更高。

关键词: 产业共性技术, 跨组织合作研发, 信息技术支持, 微分博弈