Abstract: With the advent of the digital intelligence era and the rapid development of emerging technologies, technical standards have gradually become the focus of enterprise and industry competition. Although China has successively introduced a number of policies and regulations to boost the implementation of technical standards strategy, technical standards drafted by China are still rare. Technical standard alliance is an alliance organization to achieve the goal of technology standardization, in which enterprises with key technical intellectual property rights and strong research and development strength are the core of the alliance. The emergence of standard alliance organizations has accelerated the process of enterprise technology standardization, but there are still some problems such as the poor cooperation among alliance members and lack of profit distribution criteria. Therefore, it is important to deeply analyze the technical standardization of the standard alliances and discuss the cooperation mode and benefit mechanism among the members of the alliance.
Based on the differential game theory, this paper includes both technical standard R&D and diffusion into the research framework, takes the leading and supporting enterprises in the alliance as the research object, examines the optimal strategies and optimal returns of the two game parties under different mechanisms, and discusses the benefit distribution mechanism of the standard alliance under the dynamic framework. A leading enterprise refers to the enterprise in the core position in the alliance that has advanced key technologies, and rich technical and market resources, and undertakes the main task of technology standardization. Supporting enterprises refer to enterprises with heterogeneous technology and production resources that could support and assist leading enterprises to jointly promote technology standardization activities.
In the model description part, this paper puts forward five assumptions such as standardization cost, technology level, market share, market demand and so on. In the model analysis section, it constructs and explores the technical standardization strategies and benefits of alliance enterprises under the three mechanisms of Nash non-cooperation, cost-sharing and collaborative cooperation, respectively. Under the Nash non-cooperation mechanism, both leading and supporting enterprises aim at maximizing their own revenue. Under the cost-sharing mechanism, leading enterprises take the initiative to bear part of the standardization costs for supporting enterprises. Under the collaborative cooperation mechanism, both leading and supporting enterprises work together to maximize the overall benefits of the alliance, and jointly determine the standardization strategies of both sides of the game. In the equilibrium comparative analysis part, it compares the optimal strategies of alliance enterprises, system benefits and technology standardization level under different mechanisms, and then proposes the revenue synergy mechanism of the alliance. In the simulation analysis section, it integrates the results of expert consultation and existing studies to assign values to the model parameters, and then simulates and analyzes the development and evolution of alliance enterprise strategies, enterprise and overall revenues, and technology standardization level to verify the correctness of the previous proposition.
It is found that the optimal strategy of alliance enterprises is negatively correlated with the cost coefficient, technology decline and market shrinkage coefficient, and positively correlated with technology and market sensitivity factors; under the cooperation mechanism, the optimal strategy, optimal revenue and technology standardization level of the alliance enterprises are the highest, and the effect of standard R&D and diffusion is the best; there exists the optimal benefit distribution mechanism, which could realize the system Pareto optimality and the highest individual revenue at the same time.

Key words: differential game, standard alliance, standard R&D, standard diffusion

摘要： 技术标准联盟是推动技术标准化行为的重要载体,标准研发和标准市场扩散是技术标准化中的关键内容,因此将双方同时纳入标准联盟技术标准化问题的研究中具有重要意义。本文基于微分博弈理论,从动态视角分别考察了三种博弈机制下,联盟内主导、配套企业的技术标准化最优策略、最优收益、联盟技术水平及标准扩散变化情况。研究发现:联盟企业最优策略与成本系数、衰退系数等呈负相关,与技术、市场敏感因子等呈正相关;协同合作机制下,联盟企业的最优策略,最优收益及技术标准化程度最高,标准研发及市场扩散的效果最好;存在最优的利益分配机制,能够同时实现系统帕累托最优和企业个体收益最高。

关键词: 微分博弈, 技术标准联盟, 标准研发, 标准扩散