Abstract: Capital shortage is a significant factor constraining the development of supply chains. Since the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020, many firms have faced cash flow constraints and the risk of bankruptcy due to production disruptions and declining revenues, which has exacerbated the problem of funding shortages for SMEs. Due to strict credit history and collateral requirements, it is difficult for SMEs to access bank financing. As a result, Third-Party Logistics(3PL)firms are helping SMEs ease their financial pressures by providing guarantor financing services, which are becoming increasingly popular. For example, large Chinese logistics providers such as Eternity Asia and SF Express have been offering such services for many years. The popularity of 3PL guarantor financing raises several questions worth exploring: How do different financing schemes affect the retailer’s purchasing decision? What is the optimal decision for supply chain members under 3PL guarantor financing, and when should the 3PL firm offer guarantor financing rather than allowing the retailer to use bank financing directly? These questions remain pressing issues in practice.
This paper explores two financing schemes: traditional bank financing and 3PL guarantor financing to analyze the efficacy of 3PL guarantor financing. In the traditional scheme, the retailer obtains a loan directly from the bank, while the 3PL firm only provides transportation services. In the 3PL guarantor financing scheme, on the other hand, the 3PL firm guarantees the retailer’s loan in addition to transport, and the 3PL firm is required to bear the loss of the bank’s loan if the retailer defaults due to demand fluctuations. By constructing a Stackelberg game model involving the 3PL firm and financially constrained retailer, this paper analyzes the equilibrium order quantity of the retailer and the equilibrium logistics price of the 3PL firm. Comparing 3PL guarantor financing with bank financing, the study also explores the financing preferences of both parties in the supply chain and concludes as follows: Firstly, the optimal order quantity is higher under 3PL guarantor financing than under bank financing. This indicates that risk-sharing by the 3PL firm in guarantor financing incentivizes the retailer to order more, thereby enhancing supply chain efficiency. Additionally, 3PL guarantor financing enables supply chain coordination at a given procurement cost. Secondly, the optimal logistics price is higher in 3PL guarantor financing than in bank financing. This suggests that the 3PL firm should control the retailer’s default risk by increasing the price, which may have a negative impact on the retailer and supply chain. Thirdly, the retailer consistently prefers bank financing, while the 3PL firm prefers 3PL guarantor financing when the procurement cost is not too high, and the retailer prefers to use bank financing otherwise. Finally, 3PL guarantor financing can be a consistent choice for both parties due to its Pareto improvement when the purchasing cost is at a lower level. The findings of this paper also give some managerial insights. First, 3PL firms can provide logistics and guarantor financing services to increase retailers’ order quantity and enhance their own profits. Second, competition from external banks can motivate 3PL firms to maintain a competitive edge in logistics pricing, making their provided guarantor financing services a common choice for both parties, thus improving efficiency and fairness.
This paper considers a case where a 3PL firm provides guarantor financing service to only one retailer. Exploring the efficiency of 3PL guarantor financing for multiple capital-constrained retailers would be interesting. Additionally, it is of practical interest to explore the impact of supply chain firms’ risk attitudes and information asymmetry on equilibrium operational and financing decisions of supply chain participants.

Key words: supply chain management, capital constraints, financing strategy, bank financing, third-party logistics guarantor financing

摘要： 资金短缺是制约供应链发展的重要因素。3PL企业因在供应链中的有利地位,其提供的新型担保融资越来越受到中小企业的青睐。本文聚焦3PL企业物流和担保融资的双重角色,通过构建一个由3PL企业和资金短缺的零售商组成的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了3PL企业和零售商的最优运营和融资决策,并探讨了供应链双方的融资偏好。研究发现:零售商在第三方物流担保融资模式中的订货量更高,而3PL企业在第三方物流担保融资模式中收取更高的物流价格。当采购成本满足一定条件时第三方物流担保融资可以实现供应链的协调。当采购成本较低时,3PL企业偏好第三方物流担保融资;反之,3PL企业偏好零售商采用银行融资。零售商的偏好一直是银行融资。存在一个物流价格的帕累托区域,使得第三方物流担保融资可以成为双方一致的融资选择。

关键词: 供应链管理, 资金约束, 融资策略, 银行融资, 第三方物流担保融资