Abstract: By considering multi-facet factors of consumer preference and product safety level, this paper establishes a duopoly two-stage game model with two players owning two different food safety strategies. The first stage is that duopoly producers choose product safety level. The second stage is that duopoly producers determine the products’ price. Further more, a numerical case is presented to discuss the effect of consumer preference and product safety market entrance level. Two results are finally acquired. Firstly, as consumer preference payment coefficient increases, the profit of the two producers with different food safety strategies would increase. Secondly, as the product safety market entrance level increases, the profit of the proactive producer focusing on positive food safety strategy would increase whilst the profit of the reactive producer centering upon low-price strategy would decrease. The managerial implications are also discussed. The result may provide viable suggestions for the decision making of producers and government.

Key words: consumer preference, market entrance, product safety level, two-stage game

摘要： 考虑消费者产品安全偏好和产品安全水平等因素,针对采取不同产品安全战略的两个寡头制造商,建立了两阶段博弈模型:第一阶段为两制造商选择各自的产品安全度水平,第二阶段为两产品制造商确定各自的产品价格。通过数值仿真重点讨论了消费者产品安全偏好支付系数和产品安全市场准入值两参数变化带来的影响。结果表明:消费者安全偏好支付系数提高时,两制造商利润均增加;产品安全准入值提高时,低价战略采取者的利润下降;主动安全战略采取者利润增加。所得结论对于产品安全管理中政府及不同类型制造商的决策具有参考价值和指导意义。

关键词: 消费者偏好, 市场准入, 产品安全水平, 两阶段博弈