Abstract: Clan games with interval payoffs are studied. In such games, players are divided into two classes: one is clan members who have veto power, and the other is non-clan members who are powerless. In the interval core, the maximum allocation of a non-clan member is his marginal interval contribution to the grand coalition. A necessary and sufficient condition for total clan interval games is presented. Population monotonic interval allocation schemes and bi-monotonic interval allocation schemes are introduced for total clan interval games. If the interval subtractions are well defined, then the interval core elements of total clan interval games are both population monotonic interval allocation schemes extendable and bi-monotonic interval allocation schemes extendable. An example shows the validity of this model.

Key words: cooperative interval games, clan, interval core, monotonic interval allocation scheme

摘要： 在区间不确定环境下,针对具有否决权的成员与其他成员之间的合作,建立了具有区间支付的宗派对策。在区间核心中,非宗派成员得到的区间分配不能超过他对大联盟的边际贡献。给出了完全区间宗派对策的等价条件。当相应的区间减法可行时,完全区间宗派对策的区间核心中的分配可以通过两种单调区间分配方案扩张得到。算例验证了模型的有效性。

关键词: 区间合作对策, 宗派, 区间核心, 单调区间分配方案