Abstract: In the case that consumers are low-carbon preference, we develop a game model consisting of a large enterprise and multiple small enterprises where the large enterprise is a leader and the small enterprises multiple followers. We have established the game model where small enterprises produce common products and large enterprise can choose to produce not only common products, but also low-carbon products. Our study finds that when the small companies are symmetric, greater carbon reduction will lead the large company to produce low-carbon products to obtain higher retail price. In addition, when the large enterprise chooses to produce ordinary products, the small enterprises will have higher sales. Whether the large enterprise chooses to produce low-carbon products or not depends on the number of small enterprises, the acceptance of consumer to the small enterprises’ products, and the carbon emission reduction of low-carbon products. When the small enterprises are asymmetric, with less number of small enterprises, the large enterprise will choose to produce common products. As the number of small enterprises is growing, the large enterprise will choose to produce low carbon products.

Key words: carbon preferences, enterprise competition, low carbon products, product selection

摘要： 在考虑消费者低碳偏好的情形下,建立了一个大企业作为领导者与多个小企业之间的博弈模型。在小企业生产普通产品情形下,研究了大企业低碳产品选择策略。研究发现:当小企业对称时,较大的碳减排量会促使大企业生产低碳产品以获得较高的零售价格,且小企业在大企业选择普通产品时有较高的销量;大企业制造商是否生产低碳产品取决于小企业的个数、消费者对小企业产品的认可度以及低碳产品低碳减排量的综合影响。当小企业不对称时,较少的小企业数量会促使大企业选择生产普通产品,而小企业数量较多时,大企业会生产低碳产品。

关键词: 低碳偏好, 企业竞争, 低碳产品, 产品选择