Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2017, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (6): 1-9.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2017.0129

• Theory Analysis and Methodology Study •     Next Articles

Marketing Channel Selection When Remanufacturing

ZOU Zong-bao1, WANG Jian-jun2, DENG Gui-shi2   

  1. 1.Sun Yat-sen Business School, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China;
    2.Faculty of Management and Economics, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116023, China
  • Received:2014-08-20 Online:2017-06-25

再制造产品销售渠道决策分析

邹宗保1, 王建军2, 邓贵仕2   

  1. 1.中山大学 管理学院,广东 广州 510275;
    2.大连理工大学 管理与经济学部,辽宁 大连 116023
  • 作者简介:邹宗保( 1982-),男,江西吉安人,博士后,研究方向:再制造运营管理;王建军( 1977-),男,教授,博士生导师,研究方向: 运作管理、电子商务与物流管理、管理决策等; 邓贵仕( 1945-),男,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:信息系统工程,新兴电子商务理论与技术。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271039,71372083);教育部“新世纪优秀人才”资助项目(NCET-13-0082);教育部“创新团队发展计划”资助项目(IRT1214)

Abstract: The emergence of remanufactured product raises new problems in the marketing channel selection. Based on the game theory, five typical marketing structures are analyzed and compared. The equilibrium quantities and prices of the new product and remanufactured one are obtained under the five marketing modes, as well as the equilibrium profits. The results show that the manufacturer can increase its benefit by introducing competition between retailers generally. However, when one retailer only sells new products and the other only sells remanufactured ones, separately, the manufacturer can’t increase its profit. In the bilateral monopoly model, the status of retailers will be promoted. Nevertheless, retailers will be hurt if the new products or remanufactured ones separately are retailed. Numerical results show that the competition between retailers mitigates the double marginal effect and increases the profit of the supply chain, consumer surplus and social welfare.

Key words: remanufacturing, marketing channel selection, game theorem

摘要: 再制造产品的出现,引出了销售渠道决策的新问题。基于博弈理论,分析比较新制造产品和再制造产品五种渠道结构,得到了五种结构下新制造产品和再制造产品均衡产量和零售价格,以及制造商和零售商的均衡利润。研究结果表明,一般情况下,制造商可以凭借零售商之间的竞争提升自身在供应链的权重,使自己获利。然而当制造商通过两个零售商分开销售新制造产品和再制造产品时,制造商并不能因此而增加自己的利润。对于零售商而言,双边垄断使零售商地位提升,而新制造产品或者再制造产品分开销售都会伤及零售商。数值结果表明,零售商之间的竞争缓和了供应链上下游的双重边际效应,增加了供应链的总利润,同时也提高消费者剩余和社会福利。

关键词: 再制造, 销售渠道选择, 博弈论

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