Abstract: With the rapid development of information industry and the wide application of Internet insurance, for recent years, a new type of insurance mode-P2P Insurance(Peer to Peer Insurance)has emerged in the world. This model is based on the Internet, through gathering a number of policyholders with similar risks to set up risk-sharing group. Members of risk support group are usually relatives, friends or acquaintances. Mutual supervision mechanism and reputation mechanism formed by P2P insurance can solve the moral hazard problem in the traditional insurance market. In this paper, using the comparative static analysis method in economics, we study the problems of moral hazard of P2P insurance and prove theoretically that under the P2P insurance mode, the policyholder tends to guard against the risk to reduce the risk probability, and the moral hazard problems can be effectively alleviated.

Key words: P2P insurance, moral hazard, comparative static analysis

摘要： 伴随信息产业的快速发展和互联网保险的广泛运用,近几年来国际上出现了一种新型保险模式――P2P保险(Peer to Peer Insurance)。该模式基于互联网,通过聚集若干风险类型相似的投保人组建风险共担互助小组,风险互助小组成员间一般是亲戚、朋友等熟人关系。P2P保险形成的相互监督机制和声誉机制,可以较好地解决传统保险市场中存在的道德风险问题。本文利用经济学中的比较静态分析方法,研究了P2P保险的道德风险问题,并从理论上证明了在P2P保险模式下,投保人会倾向于更加努力防范风险以降低出险概率,道德风险问题可以得到有效缓解。

关键词: P2P保险, 道德风险, 比较静态分析