Abstract: This paper focuses on the effect of fairness preference on the collaboration in project investment. In particular, it analyses how entrepreneur's fairness preference affects equity share and effort levels of the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. Taking into account the effort complementarity of the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur, a venture capital incentive contracting model in which an entrepreneur displays fairness preference is analyzed. Nash bargaining solution is employed to interpret entrepreneur's reference point of fairness preference. We solve the venture capital's maximization problem in the presence of double-sided moral hazard. The results show that fairness preference changes the optimal equity share and effort levels. We simulate the model and show that the venture capitalist's effort does not monotonically decrease in the share allocated to the venture capital, while the entrepreneur's effort does not monotonically increase in his share. More importantly, the entrepreneur displaying fairness preference will take Nash bargaining solution as his lower limit of equity share in the case of a small degree of effort complementarity, and yet the Nash bargaining solution may be regarded as upper limit of equity share when the degree of effort complementarity is large. The result can provide decision support for venture capitalist to develop the incentive contract more effectively.

Key words: fairness preference, effort complementarity, double-sided moral hazard, project investment, equity share

摘要： 决策者的公平偏好对项目投资合作的形成和推进有重要影响。本文从创业企业和风险投资家的双重道德风险出发,选取Nash谈判解为公平偏好参照点,构建创业企业具有公平偏好的项目投资委托代理模型,研究委托方和代理方的能力存在互补效应的情形下,公平偏好对项目收益分配及双方努力水平的影响。结果表明:项目收益的最优分配比例和双方的最高努力水平均与创业企业的公平偏好程度相关。在互补效应存在时,双方的努力水平不会随收益分配比例的变化呈现单调变化趋势。如果双方的能力互补程度较小,具有公平偏好的创业企业会以Nash谈判解为自己的收益下限,风险投资家需要向其让渡更多的项目收益才能实现有效激励;如果双方的能力互补程度较大,创业企业会将Nash谈判解作为自己的收益上限,风险投资家即使不给予其大于Nash谈判解的收益也可实现有效激励。

关键词: 公平偏好, 互补效应, 双边道德风险, 项目投资, 收益分配