Multiple Reference Points, Fairness Preference and Design ofCoordination Mechanism in Three Layer Supply Chains

doi:10.12005/orms.2017.0141

Abstract

Abstract: In this paper, we propose a manufacturer-distributor-retailer supply chain model and analyze the supply chain operations’ deviation caused by retailer’s fairness which depends on multiple reference points. And then a revenue sharing combined contract is designed as the coordination mechanism in the three layer supply chain. The results show that the mechanism, that is, the retailer’s fairness about the manufacturer’s profit or the distributor’s profit affects the wholesale price and the distributor price, is different. The retailer’s fairness leads to profit redistribution among supply chain members while the whole supply chain’s profit remains unchanged. A revenue sharing combined contract can be used to make each firm Pareto optimal when the retailer's fairness is affected by the multiple reference points. Finally a numerical simulation is proposed to prove the availability of the revenue sharing combined contract.

Key words: fairness preference, multiple reference points, behavior operation, coordination mechanism in three layer supply chains

摘要： 在“单个制造商—单个分销商—单个零售商”三级供应链框架下,考察零售商依赖于多重参照点的公平偏好对于供应链运作造成的偏差,并在此基础上设计一个能够实现供应链整体协调的利润共享组合契约。研究发现:零售商对分销商利润和制造商利润的公平感知影响批发价格和分销价格变动的机制具有差异性;零售商的公平偏好不影响供应链的整体利润,但是会引起利润在各厂商间的重新分配;通过实行一个合理的利润共享组合契约,可以在零售商具有公平偏好的情形下达到供应链全局最优。最后用数值仿真验证了该利润共享组合契约作为协调机制的可行性。

关键词: 公平偏好, 多重参照点, 行为运筹, 三级供应链协调

CLC Number:

F224
C931

PU Xu-jin, JIN De-long. Multiple Reference Points, Fairness Preference and Design ofCoordination Mechanism in Three Layer Supply Chains[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(6): 89-94.

浦徐进, 金德龙. 多重参照点、公平偏好和三级供应链协调机制设计[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(6): 89-94.

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