Excess Control and Corporate Cash Holdings ——A Moderating Effect Based on the Control of Family Founder

doi:10.12005/orms.2021.0032

Abstract

Abstract: Based on the agency cost theory and dynamic trade-off theory, this paper selects the data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2007 to 2017, and empirically tests the internal relationship between the founder control of family enterprises and the level of cash holdings. The study finds that: (1)the family over-control is significantly positively correlated with the cash holding level; (2)the family controlled by founders, can effectively inhibit the impact of family over-control on cash holdings. (3)The further study indicates that, the cash holding level of the founder controlling family business in China is significantly lower than that of the non-founder controlling family business.These conclusions not only support the “rent-seeking view” of family control at the micro governance level, but also reveal the positive role played by founders in the corporate governance of family enterprises to some extent.

Key words: family founder control, excess control rights, cash holdings

摘要： 本文基于代理成本理论、动态权衡理论,选取2007年~2017年中国沪、深A 股家族上市公司数据,实证检验了家族企业超额控制权对现金持有水平的内在影响。研究结论显示:(1)家族超额控制权与现金持有水平显著正相关;(2)而家族创始人控制能够有效的抑制家族超额控制权对现金持有水平的影响。在控制了超额控制权的影响之后,进一步研究发现:(3)与非创始控制家族相比,创始家族的现金持有水平显著低于非创始家族。本文的研究结论不仅在微观治理层面,进一步证实了家族超额控制的“寻租观”,与此同时也揭示出,创始人在家族企业公司治理中所扮演的积极角色。

关键词: 创始人控制, 超额控制权, 企业现金持有

CLC Number:

F275

ZHANG Tao, LI Bing-xiang. Excess Control and Corporate Cash Holdings ——A Moderating Effect Based on the Control of Family Founder[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2021, 30(1): 225-233.

张涛, 李秉祥. 超额控制权与企业现金持有——基于家族创始人控制的调节效应[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(1): 225-233.

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