考虑公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链收益共享契约

doi:10.12005/orms.2015.0201

运筹与管理 ›› 2015, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (6): 103-111.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2015.0201

考虑公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链收益共享契约

孙玉玲, 洪美娜, 石岿然

南京工业大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京 211816

收稿日期:2014-01-27 出版日期:2015-12-25
作者简介:孙玉玲(1976-),女,博士,副教授,研究方向:行为运作管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71301073,71071075);国家社科基金重大项目(12&ZD204);教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(12YJC630180);江苏省研究生实践创新项目(SJLX_0357)

Revenue Sharing Contract of Supply Chain for Fresh Agricultural Products Considering Fairness Concerns

SUN Yu-ling, HONG Mei-na, SHI Kui-ran

School of Economics and Business Administration, Nanjing Tech University, Nanjing 211816, China

Received:2014-01-27 Online:2015-12-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 研究收益共享契约下供应链成员具有公平关切时的鲜活农产品供应链协调问题。基于鲜活农产品的新鲜度和运输损耗因素,考虑供应链成员的公平关切特性,建立二级鲜活农产品供应链收益共享契约模型。进而分析了仅有零售商或供应商一方考虑公平关切,以及双方都考虑公平关切等不同情形下的供应链协调机制。分析结果表明,考虑供应链成员公平关切特性的情况下,当批发价满足一定条件时,收益共享契约能够使鲜活农产品供应链实现协调,且公平关切对供应链成员的效用有一定影响。最后运用算例对研究结果进行了验证。

关键词: 供应链协调, 收益共享契约, 公平关切, 鲜活农产品

Abstract: The paper studies supply chain coordination of fresh agricultural products when supply chain players consider fairness under revenue sharing contract, respectively. Considering the characteristics of fresh agricultural products and behavior of fairness preference, the paper presents a two-echelon supply chain model of fresh agriculture products, then investigates supply chain coordination mechanism when only the retailer or the supplier considers fairness and both of them consider fairness. The results reveal that revenue sharing contract can coordinate supply chain of fresh products as long as wholesale price satisfy certain condition, and fairness concerns can affect supply chain players’ utility. Finally, numerical examples illustrate the results.

Key words: supply chain coordination, revenue sharing contract, fairness concern, fresh agricultural products

中图分类号:

F253.4

孙玉玲, 洪美娜, 石岿然. 考虑公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链收益共享契约[J]. 运筹与管理, 2015, 24(6): 103-111.

SUN Yu-ling, HONG Mei-na, SHI Kui-ran. Revenue Sharing Contract of Supply Chain for Fresh Agricultural Products Considering Fairness Concerns[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2015, 24(6): 103-111.

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考虑公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链收益共享契约

Revenue Sharing Contract of Supply Chain for Fresh Agricultural Products Considering Fairness Concerns

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