关键词: 线上结合线下, 服务, 微分博弈, 成本分担, 供应链协调

Abstract: This paper focuses on an O2O supply chain system which consists of a traditional e-commerce company and an offline brick and mortar retailer. Extant literature illustrates that offline service can elevate the demand of the online and offline channel, which accounts for why more and more companies are willing to embrace offline shops. Among these companies, many choose to open their own-operating shops while others may be inclined to cooperate with the established retailer which exactly corresponds to the centralized and decentralized pattern. Consequently, this paper explores the optimal dynamic strategies of both players under both scenarios and conduct the sensitivity analysis of decisions regarding important parameters. Meanwhile, given the marginalization effect innate in decentralized decision, we also devise a cost-sharing incentive mechanism which intends to coordinate the supply chain. The results show that 1)when the offline channel preference increases, supply chain members should always elevate their offline pricing; 2)cost-sharing strategy can enhance the investment of brick-and-mortar retailer in service and therefore boost the goodness level; 3)cost-sharing strategy can achieve the Pareto improvement by advancing the profits of both players; 4)under certain circumstance, the cost-revenue sharing mechanism can coordinate the supply chain.

Key words: online to offline, service, differential game, cost-sharing, supply chain coordination