基于多任务委托代理模型的导游动态薪酬契约设计

doi:10.12005/orms.2015.0223

运筹与管理 ›› 2015, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (6): 281-288.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2015.0223

• 管理科学 • 上一篇

基于多任务委托代理模型的导游动态薪酬契约设计

黄艳, 罗定提, 鲁芳, 祝新春

湖南工业大学管理科学与工程研究所,湖南株洲 412007

收稿日期:2013-09-23 出版日期:2015-12-25
作者简介:黄艳(1988-),女,湖南郴州人,硕士,研究方向:旅游服务供应链;罗定提(1963-),男,湖南浏阳人,博士、教授、硕士生导师,研究方向:物流与供应链管理、委托代理理论等;鲁芳(1979-),通信作者,女,湖南浏阳人,博士、副教授、硕士生导师,研究方向:信息安全、物流与供应链管理等;祝新春(1990-),男,安徽安庆人,硕士,研究方向:服务供应链。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71201053)

Design of Tour Guide’s Dynamic Salary Contract Based on Multi-task Principal-agent Model

HUANG Yan, LUO Ding-ti, LU Fang, ZHU Xin-chun

Institute of Management Science & Engineering, Hunan University of Technology, Zhuzhou 412007, China

Received:2013-09-23 Online:2015-12-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 旅游服务质量是旅游业可持续发展的重要决定因素,如何通过设计合理的薪酬契约激励导游努力提高服务质量是现今旅行社面临的难题。基于Holmstrom提出的多任务代理模型,考虑导游的纵向多任务特性,将导游投入划分为追求当期业绩和追求服务质量的旅行社声誉建设两个维度的多任务问题,导游的服务绩效由其个人业绩和服务质量决定,以此为基础构建了多周期动态契约,与没有考虑服务质量投入的单周期静态契约进行比较分析,最后给出了其数值仿真结果。结果表明:本文所提多周期动态契约对旅行社和导游双方具有明显的帕累托效率改进,且从长远来看,对旅行社声誉的提高以及游客满意度的提升效果显著。

关键词: 旅游服务供应链, 动态薪酬契约, 多任务委托代理, 旅行社声誉, 服务质量

Abstract: In tourism service supply chain, service quality is the important determinant of tourism sustainability, so a difficult question is how the travel agency can design an incentive salary contract to make tour guides improve service quality effectively and efficiently. Considering the vertical multi-task specialty of guides and starting from the Multi-task Agent Model originated by Holmstrom, this paper divides guide’s effort into two dimensions: the profit-making action which pursues individual performance and the strategic service action which is in pursuit of service quality to promote travel agency’s reputation. Based on it, this study constructs guide’s multi-cycle dynamic salary contract model, and compares with the single-period static contract model without considering the service quality. Finally, the numerical simulation results are given. The model shows that the pare-to-efficiency of multi-cycle dynamic salary contract for travel agencies and tour guides is better than traditional contract, and in the long run, it is obvious to raise the travel agency reputation and improve the tourist satisfaction.

Key words: tourism service supply chain, dynamic salary contract, multi-task principal-agent, ravel agency reputation, service quality

中图分类号:

F244.3

黄艳, 罗定提, 鲁芳, 祝新春. 基于多任务委托代理模型的导游动态薪酬契约设计[J]. 运筹与管理, 2015, 24(6): 281-288.

HUANG Yan, LUO Ding-ti, LU Fang, ZHU Xin-chun. Design of Tour Guide’s Dynamic Salary Contract Based on Multi-task Principal-agent Model[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2015, 24(6): 281-288.

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基于多任务委托代理模型的导游动态薪酬契约设计

Design of Tour Guide’s Dynamic Salary Contract Based on Multi-task Principal-agent Model

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