关键词: 安全评价, 三方博弈, 服务质量, 质量监管

Abstract: Quality supervision of safety assessment service is an important way to effectively prevent enterprises with poor safety condition from engaging in production and operation activities and thereby to raise the effectiveness of safety regulation. In order to find out the effective way to restrict the immoral behaviors of safety assessment organizations, taking all agents in the safety assessment service market as the research object and considering low service quality of safety assessment and low effectiveness of quality supervision, the tripartite static game model among local safety supervision authorities, safety assessment organizations and enterprises of high-risk industries under incomplete information is built. The equilibrium solution of the model was analyzed. From the interest realization mechanism, the key ways to formulate regulatory countermeasures to effectively guarantee the quality of safety assessment services is explored. The results show that the actions of local safety supervision authorities, safety assessment organizations and enterprises depends mainly on the direct compliance costs, penalties for violations as well as exposure probability of violations. The conclusions and policy recommendations of this study are of guiding significance for enhancing service quality of safety assessment in our country.

Key words: safety assessment, the tripartite game, service quality, quality supervision