关键词: 电子商务, 生态系统, 信用机制, 动态演化, 三方博弈

Abstract: Shopping online is very convenient,but there are still many problems such as counterfeit goods, credibility crisis, and lack of norms in the e-commerce ecosystem. For example, The listing of the Pingduoduo has been controversial. Products as such “Leibi, Kang Shuaifu, Yueli Yue, and Maibo” Still exist in the e-commerce. Credit is very important for e-commerce, and the credit supervision responsibility of e-commerce platform can not be ignored. Therefore, based on the game theory, consumer complaints are introduced into the credit supervision mechanism of the e-commerce platform, and a long-term strategic evolution game model is constructed under the asymmetric information. The influencing factors of game strategy selection and behavior evolution under the dual supervision of active supervision of e-commerce platform and consumer complaint as well as the conditions of the stable state are analyzed, and evolution simulation analysis and numerical simulation are carried out. The research shows that the scale of merchants choosing the “integrity” strategy is closely related to the regulatory probability of the e-commerce platform and the population size of the consumer's “complaint” strategy. The establishment of merchant credit reward and punishment mechanism, credit guarantee mechanism, consumer complaint feedback mechanism, and strict crackdown on private subsidies of merchants, reducing the cost of participation of consumers and the public, which can lead to business integrity management.

Key words: e-commerce, ecosystem, credit mechanism, dynamic evolutionary , three-party game