关键词: 闭环供应链, 市场力量, 博弈论, 政府规制, WEEE

Abstract: To investigate the influence of different market powers and government regulations on closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)decision-makings for waste electrical and electronic equipment(WEEE), two models for CLSC consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and customers are developed with or without government regulations respectively. Based on game theory, optimal government regulation tools, optimal operation strategies and profits of CLSC members, and optimal social welfare are obtained while the market is dominated by the manufacturer or the retailer. The results show that whether it is under government regulation or not, the market power has no impacts on retail price, recycling rate, government regulation tools and social welfare, but it would influence wholesale price, collection price and profits of members. While the market is dominated by the manufacturer, the wholesale price is higher; while the market is dominated by retailer, the collection price is higher. In general, both the manufacturer and the retailer can achieve maximal profits when the market is dominated by itself. In addition, whether the market is dominated by the manufacturer or the retailer, government regulations would increase wholesale price and retail price. While the indicator of recycling rate is less than the manufacturer’s optimal recycling rate, government regulations would usually increase collection price and profits of members.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, market powers, game theory, government regulation, WEEE