PPP项目多维信息招投标中的直接机制研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2017.0036

运筹与管理 ›› 2017, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (2): 84-92.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2017.0036

PPP项目多维信息招投标中的直接机制研究

王先甲, 吴师为

武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉 430072

收稿日期:2016-07-23 出版日期:2017-02-25
作者简介:王先甲(1957-),男,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:博弈论、决策分析;吴师为(1992-),男,硕士研究生,研究方向:项目招投标、拍卖理论。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金重点项目资助(71231007)

Direct Mechanism Design For PPP Projects In Multidimensional Auctions

WANG Xian-jia, WU Shi-wei

School of Economic and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China

Received:2016-07-23 Online:2017-02-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于显示原理以及机制设计的思想,运用广义质量生产函数模型,针对PPP项目招标建立了关于PPP项目特许经营权期与广义质量的二维信息招标直接机制模型,在保证投标人真实显示自己综合管理能力的条件下最大化参与双方的福利。通过模型求解,得到了该招标机制的最优分配以及最低质量的设定条件,并得出在该机制下能实现社会福利最优。并鉴于机制设计的复杂性,给出了该机制的实施规则。最后通过算例,证明了该直接机制的有效性,对PPP项目招标提供了理论上的指导。

关键词: PPP模式, 招投标, 直接机制, 广义质量函数, 多维信息

Abstract: Based on the theory of mechanism design and revelation principle, this paper establishes a multidimensional auction model of infrastructure construction project under PPP model. To simplify the analysis, the paper builds the production function of generalized quality, which contributes to reducing dimension of information. Then we establish a two-dimensional auction mechanism model on the franchise period and generalized quality. After solving this model, we achieve the equilibrium solution of direct mechanism and the condition of quality requirements. Moreover, this paper finds that the direct mechanism can achieve maximum social welfare, and sets up rules for the implementation of direct mechanism. Finally, to improve the effectiveness and feasibility of the direct mechanism, we make a numerical analysis of a practical example.

Key words: PPP model, auction, direct mechanism, production function of generalized quality, multidimensional information

中图分类号:

F224.32

王先甲, 吴师为. PPP项目多维信息招投标中的直接机制研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(2): 84-92.

WANG Xian-jia, WU Shi-wei. Direct Mechanism Design For PPP Projects In Multidimensional Auctions[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(2): 84-92.

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PPP项目多维信息招投标中的直接机制研究

Direct Mechanism Design For PPP Projects In Multidimensional Auctions

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