交叉许可还是合资研发——创新应用的边际收益率的视角

doi:10.12005/orms.2018.0026

运筹与管理 ›› 2018, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (1): 178-184.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2018.0026

交叉许可还是合资研发——创新应用的边际收益率的视角

来向红

南京信息工程大学中国制造业发展研究院,江苏南京 210044

收稿日期:2015-03-02 出版日期:2018-01-25
作者简介:来向红(1979-),男,陕西礼泉,讲师,管理学博士,研究方向:创新管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金“环境规制下我国制造业转型升级研究”(71173116);中国制造业研究院2013年度开放课题(SK20130090-18);2014年江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究基金资助(2014SJB057)

Research Joint Ventures or Cross-Licensing Agreement ——on the View of the Marginal Revenue Rates of Innovation Use

LAI Xiang-hong

Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology, Nanjing 210044, China

Received:2015-03-02 Online:2018-01-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文在考虑创新应用的边际收益率的情形下,建立了一个统一的分析框架,比较了交叉许可与合资研发两种合作创新组织模式下,企业的创新水平及收益,进而给出了两种合作创新组织模式的相对优劣。结果表明:当创新被用于开发同质产品时,合资方式效率更高;当创新被用于开发非竞争性产品时,应该选择交叉许可模式;而当创新被用于开发差异化产品时,合作创新的组织模式选择还与创新的产出弹性有关。

关键词: 交叉许可, 合资研发, 合作创新, 边际收益率

Abstract: The paper builds a uniform framework, with the marginal revenue rates of innovation use, compares the two organization modes of collaborative innovation, namely, research joint ventures (RJV) and cross-licensing agreement (CLA), and analyses innovation levels and profits of the knowledge-based enterprise. It proposes the compared results between RJV and CLA under different conditions. The results manifest that RJV is more efficient when the innovation is used to develop homogeneous products by the collaborators; while the innovation is applied to unrelated products, CLA should be selected. As the innovation is used to make differentiated goods, a better organization mode depends on the innovation elasticity.

Key words: CLA, RJV, collaborative innovation, marginal revenue rates

中图分类号:

C931.1

来向红. 交叉许可还是合资研发——创新应用的边际收益率的视角[J]. 运筹与管理, 2018, 27(1): 178-184.

LAI Xiang-hong. Research Joint Ventures or Cross-Licensing Agreement ——on the View of the Marginal Revenue Rates of Innovation Use[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2018, 27(1): 178-184.

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交叉许可还是合资研发——创新应用的边际收益率的视角

Research Joint Ventures or Cross-Licensing Agreement ——on the View of the Marginal Revenue Rates of Innovation Use

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