区域合作减排策略选择及提升对策研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2019.0101

运筹与管理 ›› 2019, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (5): 35-45.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2019.0101

区域合作减排策略选择及提升对策研究

汪明月¹,刘宇^1,2,钟超³,李梦明²,史文强⁴

1.中国科学院大学公共政策与管理学院,北京 100049;
2.中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院,北京 100190;
3.北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院,北京 100875;
4.北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京 100081

收稿日期:2017-08-02 出版日期:2019-05-25
作者简介:汪明月(1988-),男,江西南昌人,博士研究生,研究方向:绿色发展,低碳经济;刘宇(1977-),男,黑龙江齐齐哈尔人,博士,研究员,硕士生导师,研究方向:政策模拟、低碳经济;钟超(1992-),男,安徽阜阳人,博士研究生,研究方向:气候变化。
基金资助:
国家重点研发计划“全球变化及应对”重点专项(2016YFA0602500);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71473242);国家自然科学基金委员会管理科学部2017年3期应急管理项目(Y71741017)

Study of Strategy Choice and Promotion Strategy of Regional Cooperative Emission Reduction

WANG Ming-yue¹, LIU Yu^1,2, ZHONG Chao², LI Meng-ming², SHI Wen-qiang³

1.School of Public Policy and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049;
2.Institutes of Science and Development, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;
3.Business School Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China;
4.School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China

Received:2017-08-02 Online:2019-05-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 跨区域合作的碳减排是实现减排目标较为有效的机制。通过构建政府间减排演化博弈模型,模拟了区域内地方政府独立减排、合作减排情形的策略选择演化过程。研究发现,(1)当区域内本地政府和外部政府经济发展水平都比较低时,无论是独立减排还是合作减排,{减排,减排}都是地方政府的稳定选择策略,但减排效果不显著;(2)独立减排情形下,经济先发地区减排意愿薄弱,后发地区有减排意愿,但减排效果并不显著;(3)合作减排时,当协同收益小于交易成本时,随着地方政府经济发展,减排系统博弈最终会向地方政府一方减排一方不减排的方向演进;当协同收益大于交易成本时,通过合作减排,实现了资源的优势互补,降低了碳排放的负外部效应,提高了减排意愿。最后提出通过搭建起区域合作交流平台,激发地方政府减排活力及推进低碳经济发展等建议,来提高协同收益或降低交易成本,有效促进区域合作减排。

关键词: 区域合作, 碳减排, 提升对策, 演化博弈理论

Abstract: The regional cooperation is an effective way to achieve emission reduction targets. Thus, through the construction of intergovernmental mitigation evolutionary game model, this paper simulates the strategic selection evolution of local governments' independent emission reduction and cooperative emission reduction. The study finds that: (1)when the level of economic development of local government and external government is relatively low, whether it is independent emission reduction or cooperative reduction, reduction is the local government stability strategy, but the effect of mitigation is not significant; (2)In the case of independent emission reduction, when the economic level of one or both are raised to a certain degree, both emission and reduction, non-emission reduction or both non-emission reduction and emission reduction are stability strategy of the system; (3)In the case of cooperative emission reduction, when the synergistic income is less than the transaction costs, with the local government economic development, local government's emission reduction game will eventually evolve into the situation that one side reduces emission and the other does not. If the synergistic income is greater than the transaction cost, the optimization of resources is achieved, reducing the negative effects of carbon emissions, and improving the willingness of reduce emissions. At last, we suggest that through building up platforms for regional cooperation, stimulating local governments to reduce emissions and promoting low-carbon economy, synergies benefits can be improved or transaction costs can be reduced, and regional cooperation in emission reduction can be effectively reached, which are of great significance to achieving emission reduction targets.

Key words: regional cooperation, carbon emission reduction, promotion strategies, evolutionary game theory

中图分类号:

F205
F207

汪明月,刘宇,钟超,李梦明,史文强. 区域合作减排策略选择及提升对策研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(5): 35-45.

WANG Ming-yue, LIU Yu, ZHONG Chao, LI Meng-ming, SHI Wen-qiang. Study of Strategy Choice and Promotion Strategy of Regional Cooperative Emission Reduction[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(5): 35-45.

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区域合作减排策略选择及提升对策研究

Study of Strategy Choice and Promotion Strategy of Regional Cooperative Emission Reduction

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