AI背景下劳动力市场合作联盟研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2019.0118

运筹与管理 ›› 2019, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (5): 175-181.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2019.0118

AI背景下劳动力市场合作联盟研究

邵全¹,赵奭¹,刘娜²,冯凯³

1.北京建筑大学经济与管理工程学院,北京 100044;
2.上海电机学院商学院,上海 200240;
3.上海隧道工程股份有限公司,上海 200032

收稿日期:2018-05-30 出版日期:2019-05-25
通讯作者: 刘娜(1974-),女,黑龙江省伊春市,副教授,博士,研究方向:劳动经济、人力资源;冯凯(1976-),男,江苏省江阴市,高级工程师、高级经济师,博士,研究方向:战略管理、创新管理。
作者简介:邵全(1968-),女,吉林省白城市,副教授,博士,研究方向:决策理论与方法,复杂系统建模与仿真;赵奭(1980-),男,北京市,工程师、一级建造师,硕士研究生,研究方向:劳动经济、生态经济;
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目成果(71741041);国家社科基金重大项目(16ZDA026);北京市教育委员会科技发展计划面上项目(Z13028);住建部项目(Z10079);校级教改项目“经管类运筹学实践教学改革研究”(J2013)

Research on the Labor Market Cooperation Alliance under the Background of AI

SHAO Quan¹, ZHAO Shi¹, LIU Na², FENG Kai³

1.School of Economics and Management Engineering, Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Beijing 100044, China;
2.School of Business, Shanghai Dianji University, Shanghai 200240, China;
3.Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Co., Ltd., Shanghai 200032, China

Received:2018-05-30 Online:2019-05-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在工作场所应用AI技术进行劳动监控对构建与发展和谐劳动关系提出了新的挑战。本文首先分析了不完全信息环境是造成劳动关系不和谐的主要根源,然后在AI背景下组建政府、企业、员工三方构成的劳动合作联盟,采用经典的Shapley Value方法对工作联盟的收益进行配置,从而实现联盟的帕累托效率。最后,引入一个算例进行了模拟计算,模拟结果说明了AI背景下社会劳动关系中需要形成基于政府、企业、员工的一个可持续的、稳定的劳动联盟,它可以有效地解决AI劳动监控所引发的道德伦理问题,更加公平地进行联盟的社会收益分配。

关键词: AI, 劳动关系, Shapley Value

Abstract: The application of AI technology in the workplace for labor supervision poses a new challenge to the construction and development of harmonious labor relations. Firstly, this paper suggests that the incomplete information environment is the main source of the disharmony of labor relations. Secondly, under the background of AI, the labor cooperation alliance composed of government, enterprises and employees is formed, and the classical Shapley Value method is used to allocate the benefits of the work alliance, to realize the Pareto efficiency of the alliance. Finally, an example is given to illustrate the necessity of forming a sustainable and stable labor union based on the government, enterprises and employees in the social labor relations under the background of AI. It can effectively solve the moral and ethical problems caused by AI labor supervision and distribute the social benefits of the alliance more fairly.

Key words: AI, labor relations, Shapley Value

中图分类号:

F224.9

邵全,赵奭,刘娜,冯凯. AI背景下劳动力市场合作联盟研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(5): 175-181.

SHAO Quan, ZHAO Shi, LIU Na, FENG Kai. Research on the Labor Market Cooperation Alliance under the Background of AI[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(5): 175-181.

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AI背景下劳动力市场合作联盟研究

Research on the Labor Market Cooperation Alliance under the Background of AI

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