损失规避环境下供应链回扣联合促销决策研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2020.0062

运筹与管理 ›› 2020, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (3): 44-52.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2020.0062

损失规避环境下供应链回扣联合促销决策研究

顾波军^1,2, 张祥^1,3, 龙莹⁴

1. 北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京 100081;
2. 浙江海洋大学经济与管理学院,浙江舟山 316022;
3. 北京经济社会可持续发展研究基地,北京 100081;
4. 浙江海洋大学海运与港航建筑工程学院,浙江舟山 316022

收稿日期:2016-01-28 出版日期:2020-03-25
作者简介:顾波军(1980-), 男, 浙江岱山人, 副教授, 博士, 研究方向:行为运作管理与供应链管理;张祥(1972-), 男, 湖北武汉人, 教授, 博士, 博士生导师, 研究方向:行为运作管理与供应链管理。龙莹(1991-), 女, 云南大理人, 硕士, 研究方向:航运物流与供应链管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71872012,71372018);教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(19YJC630044,19YJC630035);浙江省自然科学基金一般项目(LY18G010016);浙江省教育厅项目(Y201840337);舟山市科技计划项目(2017C41018);浙江海洋大学水产省一流学科开放课题(20160023);浙江海洋学院海洋科学省重中之重学科开放课题(20130212);浙江海洋大学科研启动项目(11085090318,11085090418)

A Study of Joint Promotions of Supply Chain Rebates under Loss-Averse Scenarios

GU Bo-jun^1,2, ZHANG Xiang^1,3, LONG Ying⁴

1. School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China;
2. School of Economics and Management, Zhejiang Ocean University, Zhoushan 316022, China;
3. Sustainable Development Research Institute for Economy and Society of Beijing, Beijing 100081, China;
4. School of Navigation and Ocean Engineering, Zhejiang Ocean University, Zhoushan 316022, China

Received:2016-01-28 Online:2020-03-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在由单一供应商和单一损失规避零售商组成的二阶段供应链中,基于Stackelberg博弈模型,研究零售商回扣与订单联合决策以及供应商渠道销量回扣决策,试图揭示分散决策供应链回扣联合促销机制。研究表明,给定供应商实施渠道销量回扣促销,零售商回扣与损失规避呈正向变动关系,而零售商渠道传导率与损失规避的关系依赖于产品获利情况,渠道销量回扣能提高零售商回扣与零售商期望效用;而供应商实施渠道销量回扣促销的意愿与批发价有关,只有当批发价大于某一阈值时,才能促使供应商和零售商实现回扣联合促销;但供应商实施渠道销量回扣总是能提高供应链效率。

关键词: 损失规避, 零售商回扣, 渠道销量回扣, 心里账户

Abstract: Considering a dyadic supply chain consisting of one supplier and one loss-averse retailer, the retailer's joint rebate and ordering decisions and the supplier's scanback decision are examined based on Stackelberg game, so as to uncover the joint-promotion mechanism of rebates under decentralized setting. Our research first shows that the retailer rebate is increasing in loss aversion, the monotonicity of the pass-through rate in the degree of loss aversion depends on the proit margin, and the retailer rebate and the retailer's expected utility can be improved,given the supplier offering scanback trade promotions. Another important result is to illustrate that the supplier would like to offer scanbacks only when the wholesale price is larger than the threshold value, leading to joint promotions for the supplier and the retailer. Finally, the supply chain efficiency can be always improved by the supplier's scanback incentives.

Key words: loss aversion, retailer rebate, scanback, mental accounting

中图分类号:

F273

顾波军, 张祥, 龙莹. 损失规避环境下供应链回扣联合促销决策研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(3): 44-52.

GU Bo-jun, ZHANG Xiang, LONG Ying. A Study of Joint Promotions of Supply Chain Rebates under Loss-Averse Scenarios[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(3): 44-52.

参考文献

[1] Blattberg R C, Nesliln S A. Sales promotion: concepts, methods and strategies[M]. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990.
[2] Kumar V, Madan V, Srinivasan S. Price discounts or coupon promotions: does it matter?[J]. Journal of Business Research, 2004. 57(9): 933-941.
[3] Arcelus F J, Kumar S, Srinivasan G. Pricing, rebate, advertising, and ordering policies of a retailer facing price-dependent demand in newsvendor framework under different risk preferences[J]. International Transactions in Operational Research, 2006, 13 (3): 209-227.
[4] Arcelus F J, Kumar S, Srinivasan G. The effectiveness of manufacturer vs. retailer rebates within a newsvendor framework[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, 219(2): 252-263.
[5] Drèze X, Bell D R. Creating win-win trade promotions: theory and empirical analysis of scan-back trade deals[J]. Management Science, 2003, 22(1): 16-39.
[6] Taylor T A. Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects[J]. Management Science, 2002, 48(8): 992-1007.
[7] Arcelus F J, Srinivasan G. Scanbacks and direct rebates: manufacturer's tools against forward buying[J]. International Transactions in Operational Researc, 2003, 10(6 ): 619-635.
[8] Aydin G, Porteus E L. Manufacturer-to-retailer versus manufacturer-to-consumer rebates in a supply chain[A]. Agarwal N, Smith S. Retail Supply Chain Management[M]. New York, NY: Springer US, 2009. 237-270.
[9] Caliskan-Deirag O, Chen Y, Li J. Customer and retailer rebates under risk aversion[J]. International journal of production economics, 2011, 133(2): 736-750.
[10] Saha S. Supply chain coordination through rebate induced contracts[J]. Transportation Research Part E, 2013, 50(1): 120-137.
[11] Chiu C H, Choi T M, Tang C S. Price, rebate, and returns supply contracts for coordinating supply chains with price-dependent demands[J]. Production and Operation Management, 2011, 20(1): 81-91.
[12] 姜丽宁,崔文田.目标回扣契约下供应链对突发事件的协调应对[J].运筹与管理,2012,21(2):8-13.
[13] Gerstner E, Hess J D. A theory of channel price promotions[J]. The American Economic Review, 1991, 81(4): 872-886.
[14] Cho S H, McCardle K F, Tang C S. Optimal pricing and rebate strategies in a two-level supply chain[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2009, 18(4): 426-446.
[15] Arcelus F J, Kumar S, Srinivasan G. Pricing and rebate policies for the newsvendor problem in the presence of a stochastic redemption rate[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2007, 107(2): 467-482.
[16] Arcelus F J, Gor R, Srinivasan G. Price, rebate and order quantity decisions in a newsvendor framework with rebate-dependent recapture of lost sales[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2012, 140(1): 473-482.
[17] Kahneman D, Tversky A. Prospect theory: an analysis of decisions under risk[J]. Econometrica, 1979, 47(2): 263-291.
[18] Tversky A, Kahneman D. Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty[J]. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1992, 5(4): 297-323.
[19] Schweitzer M E, Cachon G P. Decision bias in the newsvendor problem with a known demand distribution: experimental evidence[J]. Management Science, 2000, 46(3): 404-420.
[20] Thaler R. Mental accounting and consumer choice[J]. Marketing Science. 1985, 4(3): 199-214.
[21] Thaler R. Mental accounting matters[J]. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 1999, 12(3): 183-206.
[22] Ho T, Lim N, Cui T H. Reference dependence in multilocation newsvendor models: a structural analysis[J]. Management Science, 2010, 56(11): 1891-1910.
[23] Long X, Nasiry J. Prospect theory explains newsvendor behavior: the role of reference points[J]. Management Science, 2014, 61(12): 3009-3012.
[24] Avila R A, Avila T K. Rebates: an ethical issue[J]. Mid-American Journal of Business, 1986, 1(2): 41-46.
[25] Elmagrabhy W, Lippman S, Tang C S, Yin R. Will more purchasing options beneit customers?[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2009, 18(4): 381-401.
[26] Pasternack B. Optimal pricing and returns policies for perishable commodities[J]. Marketing Science, 1985, 4(2): 166-176.
[27] Narayanan V G, Raman A. Assignment of stocking decision rights under incomplete contracting[R]. Working paper, Boston, MA: Harvard University, 1997.
[28] Lariviere M A. Supply chain contracting and coordination with stochastic demand[A]. Tayur S, Ganeshan R, Magazine M. Quantitative Models of Supply Chain Management[M]. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999. 233-268.
[29] Netessine S, Rudi N. Supply chain structures on the Internet and the role of marketing-operations interactions[A]. Simchi-Levi D, Wu S D, Shen Z-J. Handbook of Quantitative Supply Chain Analysis: Modeling in the EBusiness Era[M]. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academics Publishers. 2004. 607-641.
[30] Yang S. Supply chain sales promotion: the operations and marketing interface[D]. Pullman, WA: Washington State University, 2007.
[31] Krishnan H, Kapuscinski R, Butz D A. Coordinating contracts for decentralized channels with retailer promotional effort[J]. Management Science, 2004, 50(1): 48-63.
[32] Dhar S K, Hoch S J. Price discrimination using in-store merchandising[J]. Journal of Marketing, 1996, 60(1): 17-30.
[33] Chen Y, Moorthy S, Zhang Z J. Research note-price discrimination after the purchase: rebates as state-dependent discounts[J]. Management Science, 2005, 51(7): 1131-1140.
[34] Gilpatric S M. Slippage in rebate programs and present-biased preferences[J]. Marketing Science, 2009, 28(2): 229-238.
[35] Soman D. The illusion of delayed incentives: evaluating future effort-money transactions[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1998, 35(4): 427-437.
[36] Spencer J. As cash back offers multiple, so do obstacles for consumers[N]. Wall Street Journal, 2002-6-11.
[37] Grow B, Chhatwal R. The great rebate runaround[J]. Business Week, December 5, 2005. 34-37.
[38] Silk T G. Examining purchase and non-redemption of mail-in rebates: the impact of offer variables on consumers'subjective and objective probability of redeeming[D]. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida, 2004.
[39] Becker-Peth M, Katok E, Thonemann U W. Designing contracts for irrational but predictable newsvendors[J]. Management Science, 2013, 59(8): 1800-1816.
[40] Davis A M, Katok E, Santamaría N. Push, pull, or both? A behavioral study of how the allocation of inventory risk affects channel ef ciency[J]. Management Science, 2014, 60(11): 2666-2683.
[41] 顾波军,张祥.风险中性供应商与损失规避零售商基于收益共享契约的供应链协商[J].系统管理学报,2016,25(1):67-74.
[42] Zabel E. Monopoly and uncertainty[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1970, 37(2): 205-219.
[43] Petruzzi N C, Dada M. Pricing and the newsvendor problem: a review with extensions[J]. Operation Research, 1999, 47(2): 183-194.
[44] Barlow R E, Proschan F. Statistical theory of reliability and life testing: probability models[M]. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975.
[45] Wang C X, Webster S. Channel coordination for a supply chain with a risk-neutral manufacturer and a loss-averse retailer[J]. Decision Sciences, 2007, 38(3): 361-389.
[46] Tyagi R K. A characterization of retailer response to manufacture trade deals[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1999, 36(4): 510-516.
[47] Chevalier M, Curhan R C. Retail promotion as a function of trade promotion: a descriptive analysis[J]. Sloan Management Review, 1976, 18(Fall): 19-32.
[48] Walters R G. An empirical investigation into retailer response to manufacturer trade promotions[J]. Journal of Retailing, 1989, 65(2): 253-271.
[49] Neslin S A, Powell S G, Stone L S. The effects of retailer and consumer response on optimal manufacturer advertising and trade promotion strategies[J]. Management Science, 1995, 41(5): 749-766.
[50] Kumar N, Rajiv S, Jeuland A. Effectiveness of trade promotions: analyzing the determinants of retail pass through[J]. Marketing Science, 2001, 20(4): 382-404.
[51] Ailawadi K L, Harlam B A. Retailer promotion pass-through: a measure, its magnitude, and its determinants[J]. Marketing Science, 2009, 28(4): 782-791.
[52] Blattberg R C, Neslin S A. Sales promotion models[A]. Eliashberg J, Lilien G L. Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science[M]. Amsterdam, North Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1993, 553-609.
[53] Armstrong M K. Retailer response to trade promotion: an incremental analysis of forward buying and retail promotion[D]. Dallas, TX: University of texas at Dallas, 1991.
[54] Emmons H, Gilbert S M. Note. the role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods[J]. Management Science, 1998, 44(2): 276-283.

损失规避环境下供应链回扣联合促销决策研究

A Study of Joint Promotions of Supply Chain Rebates under Loss-Averse Scenarios

PDF

可视化

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 1

编辑推荐

Metrics