关键词: 展厅模式, 退货, 体验成本, 价格与服务策略, Bertrand博弈

Abstract: This paper divides consumers into two types, high and low experience cost consumers based on different experience cost, and then establishes the utility function for each consumer. Subsequently, it analyzes the Bertrand game between two manufacturers about whether to open the showrooms and their corresponding price-service strategies after opening the showroom. Finally, it analyzes the equilibrium of opening showroom. The results show that both manufactures would open showrooms when the percentage of low experience cost consumers and the likelihood of a product match are high or the percentage of low experience cost consumers is low, but both manufacturers would get the least profits and trap into Prisoner's Dilemma. Under the condition of high percentage of low experience cost and low likelihood of product match, both manufacturers will choose not to open showroom and both parties achieve Pareto Optimality.

Key words: showroom, product returns, experience cost, price-service strategies, bertrand game