不透明销售的顾客退货政策选择

doi:10.12005/orms.2019.0283

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文探讨从事不透明销售的零售商对顾客退货政策的选择问题。分别针对零售商垄断和竞争两种市场情况,建立不透明零售商与其它供应链成员(制造商或普通零售商)之间的博弈模型,获得唯一均衡解;对均衡结果进行结构化分析,给出不透明销售方式下采用全额退款政策的判别条件;针对均衡结果,分析零售商垄断情况下产品不透明参数的最优设计,以及零售商竞争情况下的市场分化情况;鉴于净残值参数在退货政策选择中的决定性作用,本文进一步探讨了净残值为正时全额退款政策对各参与方利润及产品需求和价格的影响,分析了净残值在其中的作用机理。本研究能够为不透明零售商制定退货政策和价格以及其它供应链成员制定相关决策提供支持。

关键词: 不透明销售, 顾客退货政策, 定价, 渠道, 博弈

Abstract: This paper studies whether the opaque sellers can apply the full return policy as an effective tool to win competitive advantage in retailing markets. We consider two channel structures: one has a monopoly opaque seller and a manufacturer as channel members, and the other has an opaque seller, a regular seller and a manufacturer as members. For either structure, we construct Stackelberg game models, provide the unique equilibrium, and bring up the conditions of offering full return policy for the opaque seller. Furthermore, we investigate how to set the opacity parameter for monopoly retailer, and how the market differentiates in the case of retailer competition. We also study the function of net salvage value in the choice of consumer returns policy. We discuss the impact of full return policy on profits, demand and pricing when the net salvage value is positive. Our study provides theoretical support for opaque sellers in customer return policy decision and pricing decision.

Key words: opaque selling, consumer returns policy, pricing, channel, game

中图分类号:

F274

杨慧, 戈磊, 李颜戎, 孙菲. 不透明销售的顾客退货政策选择[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(12): 137-143.

YANG Hui, GE Lei, LI Yan-rong, SUN Fei. Choice of Consumer Returns Policy in Opaque Selling[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(12): 137-143.

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