关键词: 国际气候谈判, 合作协议, 内在动因, 稳定性, 合作博弈

Abstract: Starting from revenue expectation of contracting parties within agreement, the paper establishes a cooperative game theory model to study the internal motivation and stability of international cooperation governance in climate negotiations. The conclusion shows that cooperative agreement can help heterogeneous countries to increase the revenue of greenhouse gas emission reduction governance, and the internal motivation for the formation of cooperation agreements among countries participating in climate negotiations is the expected distribution of the net cooperation revenue. However, this internal motivation cannot make the cooperation agreement achieve equilibrium, equilibrium realization is a process of adjusting the internal distribution policy of expected net revenue: when some negotiating participants withdraw from the cooperative alliance as the most powerful threat, no one can gain more utility without causing losses when the alliance collapses, which makes the negotiating participants form a stable state in mutual checks and balances. The research contribution of the paper lies in breaking through the inherent non-cooperative game framework, explaining the cooperation mechanism of climate negotiation among heterogeneous countries at a more general level, and helping countries to take effective measures to establish climate cooperation alliance to cope with climate challenges.

Key words: international climate negotiations, cooperation agreement, internal motivation, stability, cooperative game