关键词: 演化博弈, 政产学研, 绿色技术创新联盟, 稳定性

Abstract: To solve the cycle of “environmental pollution-economic development”, these scientific questions that the government-university-industry alliance can facilitate the green innovation activities have been widely concerned by scholars and entrepreneurs at home and abroad. In this paper, based on evolutionary game theory, the tripartite evolutionary game model of government-enterprise-university is established to study the stability of green technology innovation alliance. Under the dynamic environment, we analyze the evolution law of government-industry-university in the process of interest game, and find key factors that affect the stability of green technology innovation alliance. Finally, the effectiveness of the model is demonstrated by numerical simulation analysis. The research results show that the government participation can effectively promote the system to optimal state in the green technology innovation alliance. The intensity of government incentives has a positive correlation with the stability of the green technology innovation alliance. At the same time, the government-industry-university should formulate reasonable default costs under the framework of the alliance contract, which can effectively avoid the opportunistic behavior of alliance members. What's more, industry groups and university groups have an optimal distribution ratio of R&D costs and green innovation benefits in the alliance.

Key words: evolutionary game, government-industry-university, green technology innovation alliance, stability