考虑地位效应时炫耀性虚拟商品的最优定价与普及版本化

doi:10.12005/orms.2021.0325

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 考虑地位效应的影响,针对炫耀性虚拟商品,决策最优定价和普及版本化。建立了单标准版策略、双版本免费普及策略和双版本销售策略等三种模型,求解得到企业在对应策略下对单版本或双版本的炫耀性虚拟商品的最优定价,在此基础上分析得到地位效应对虚拟商品价格、企业利润和最优普及版本化策略的影响。研究发现地位效应是导致标准版炫耀性虚拟商品价格和企业利润提升的因素;当存在地位效应时,双版本销售策略是炫耀性虚拟商品的最优普及版本化策略;但双版本销售策略相比于单标准版策略的优势在一定条件下因网络外部性增强而削弱。

关键词: 地位效应, 炫耀性消费, 定价, 普及版本化

Abstract: Many firms launch a light version of conspicuous virtual goods by limiting its features. In this paper, we consider a firm that sells conspicuous virtual goods in a monopoly market, and examine three light-versioning strategies with status effect for the firm. The three strategies are launching no light version, offering a free light version, and selling a light version. We obtain the firm's optimal pricing decision in each strategy, and find that the status effect always elevates the optimal price of the conspicuous virtual goods and increases the firm's profit. The strategy of selling a light version is the optimal strategy for the firm but its leading edge over launching no light version narrows as network externalities grow.

Key words: status effect, conspicuous consumption, pricing, light-versioning

中图分类号:

F272.3

陈祖光, 耿维. 考虑地位效应时炫耀性虚拟商品的最优定价与普及版本化[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(10): 134-140.

CHEN Zu-guang, GENG Wei. Optimal Pricing and Light-versioning of Conspicuous Virtual Goods with Status Effect[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2021, 30(10): 134-140.

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