竞争平台的增值服务投资均衡策略

doi:10.12005/orms.2022.0237

运筹与管理 ›› 2022, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (7): 200-206.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0237

竞争平台的增值服务投资均衡策略

范小军, 王珊珊

上海大学管理学院,上海 200444

收稿日期:2020-08-03 发布日期:2022-08-17
通讯作者: 王珊珊(1995-),女,江西九江人,博士生,研究方向为渠道管理,平台运营。
作者简介:范小军(1974-),男,江西南昌人,教授、博士生导师,研究方向为渠道战略、品牌管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71772115)

Equilibrium Strategies of Value-added ServiceInvestment with Two Competitive Platforms

FAN Xiao-jun, WANG Shan-shan

School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China

Received:2020-08-03 Published:2022-08-17

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以两个竞争平台为研究对象,考虑消费者异质性和网络外部性下服务平台是否提供增值服务,分别构建了两个平台均提供/不提供增值服务(PP/SS)和仅一个平台提供增值服务(PS)三种情景下的收益模型,求解出各情景的最优价格、服务水平和收益,并探讨了竞争平台的增值服务投资均衡策略。研究发现:(1)若平台的服务提供者数量很低时,两个平台均会提供增值服务;随着服务提供者数量的增加,仅一个平台提供增值服务(PS/SP)是均衡。(2)平台服务提供者数量的增加会削弱增值服务的利润增长优势。此外,当平台的基本服务价值低于某一阈值时,服务提供者数量较高的平台不会提供增值服务;当基本服务价值高于某一阈值时,该平台会提供增值服务。

关键词: 竞争平台, 增值服务, 投资均衡策略

Abstract: This paperstudies two competing service platforms and considers whether the platform provides value-added services with the heterogeneity of consumers. Basedon whether the two competing platforms provide value-added services, we accordingly develop the profit models under three scenarios: neither platform provides value-added services (SS), only one service platform provides value-added services (PS), and both platforms provide the value-added service (PP). We derive the optimal price, service level, and discuss the value-added service investment equilibrium strategy of the two competitive platforms. We find: (1)If the number of platform service providers is low, both platforms will provide value-added services; with the increase in the number of service providers, only one platform provides value-added services (PS / SP) is the equilibrium outcome. (2)The increase in the number of platform service providers will weaken the advantage brought by value-added services. In addition, when the value of basic services is lower than a certain threshold, the platform with more service providers will not provide value-added services; when thevalue of basic service is higher, the platform will provide value-added services.

Key words: competitive platform, value-added service, equilibrium strategy of investment

中图分类号:

C931

范小军, 王珊珊. 竞争平台的增值服务投资均衡策略[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(7): 200-206.

FAN Xiao-jun, WANG Shan-shan. Equilibrium Strategies of Value-added ServiceInvestment with Two Competitive Platforms[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2022, 31(7): 200-206.

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竞争平台的增值服务投资均衡策略

Equilibrium Strategies of Value-added ServiceInvestment with Two Competitive Platforms

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