关键词: 公众参与, 环境污染, 第三方国际环境审计, 模糊博弈

Abstract: The environmental pollution caused by the traditional manufacturing mode of enterprises has seriously hindered the sustainable development of ecological civilization. How to promote the independent transformation of enterprises to green manufacturing mode is a big problem faced by our country. As the main body of economic activities, enterprises are the main source of pollution, and the public is an important participant in environmental governance. Promoting public participation in environmental governance will increase the motivation for enterprises to carry out environmental governance. The behavioral decision of both sides is restricted by many factors. Enterprises take up the information superiority position in the game with other governance subjects. The problem of information asymmetry often exists among the game players of environmental governance, and relevant studies prove that the third party international environmental audit can effectively reduce the adverse impact of this problem. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to study the influence and existing problems of public participation on the environmental behavior of high-polluting enterprises under the third-party international environmental audit.In addition, the third-party international environmental audit applications have limitations. In order to overcome this problem, this paper applies the third party international environmental audit to the game strategy composed of triangular fuzzy numbers, and provides another explanation for the application of the third party international environmental audit under the fuzzy environment, so as to expand the application scope of the third party international environmental audit.
Existing third-party international environmental audit models often use traditional classical mathematical theories, which cannot match the uncertain behavior of real activities. Fuzzy game is a game in which the strategy set or winning function is blurred. This method is objective and computationally uncomplicated when dealing with uncertain problems.Based on the triangular fuzzy number and game theory, the game model of public participation in environmental supervision and enterprises joining the third party international environmental auditing is established, the factors affecting the selection of public and enterprise game strategy and its interaction mechanism are discussed. Finally, the triangular structure element method is used to solve the numerical example, which proves the correctness and feasibility of the conclusion.Data simulation values in this paper are derived from China Environmental Annual Report, China Environmental Statistical Yearbook, statistical data from published journals, and official websites of local environmental protection bureaus and ecological environment bureaus.
The results show that compensation for loss of public health, the cost of public participation in regulation, invisible benefits of public goodwill increased, the difference of the profit and cost of joining the third party international environmental audit for enterprise play an important role in deciding whether to join the third party international environmental audit for enterprises.In addition, through the sensitivity analysis of the changes in the values of the main parameters, the game equilibrium results of both sides show that in order to promote the implementation of positive environmental behavior by enterprises, the cost of enterprises joining the third-party international environmental audit should be reduced as far as possible, and the public health loss paid to the public due to environmental pollution caused by enterprises not joining the third-party international environmental audit should be increased. Based on the game model analysis results, this paper puts forward the following countermeasures and suggestions from the perspectives of the public, enterprises and the government.

Key words: public participation, environmental pollution, third party international environmental audit, fuzzy game theory