关键词: 制造商渠道入侵, 绿色投资, 零售商双重目标, 消费者剩余

Abstract: With the rapid development of e-commerce, more and more manufacturers have begun to open direct sales channels to sell products directly to downstream consumers, thereby directly competing with retailers. By establishing direct sales channels, manufacturers can avoid retailers, thereby understanding market demand and consumer feedback more quickly, and then adjusting product production and marketing strategies in a timely manner to improve their market response speed. Retailers are more likely to pursue consumer benefit goals than manufacturers because they are closer to downstream consumers.
This paper constructs a supply chain consisting of for-profit manufacturers and retailers pursuing dual goals, and studies the impact of retailers’ dual goals on manufacturers’ channel encroachment strategies. A supply chain composed of for-profit manufacturers and retailers is constructed, in which the retailer has the dual goals of pursuing economic benefits and social benefits (consumer surplus), while the manufacturer decides whether to conduct channel encroachment and studies the impact of retailers’ social target preferences on manufacturers’ channel encroachment strategies. In the manufacturer’s non-channel encroachment mode (strategy N), the profit-oriented manufacturer makes green investments in products and sells the products at wholesale prices to retailers with dual objectives, and the retailers make decisions based on wholesale prices,order quantities of products and sell the products to consumers at sales prices. In the manufacturer channel encroachment model (Strategy E), in addition to retail channels, manufacturers can also choose to sell products directly to consumers through their direct sales channels (supplier encroachment). Under this model, manufacturers will make green investments in products and sell products at wholesale prices to retailers with dual goals. Retailers will decide the quantity of products to order based on wholesale prices. At the same time, manufacturers will decide the sales quantity of their direct sales channels, and manufacturers and retailers and sell products to consumers at sales prices.
The study has found that the retailer’s preference for consumer surplus and the unit sales cost of the manufacturer’s direct sales channel are the key factors affecting the encroachment of the manufacturer’s channel. When the unit sales cost of the manufacturer’s direct sales channel is lower, the manufacturer will always choose channel encroachment. However, when the unit sales cost of the manufacturer’s direct sales channel is higher than that on the given threshold, the higher the retailer’s preference for consumer surplus, the higher the manufacturer’s preference for consumer surplus. Business is more inclined to channel encroachment,that is to say, as the retailer’s preference for consumer surplus increases, the manufacturer will choose not to conduct channel encroachment and channel encroachment in sequence. Consumers’ sensitivity to green investment levels will also affect manufacturers’ channel encroachment strategies. If the level of consumers’ green investment is lower than that on a given threshold, the manufacturer’s channel encroachment strategy depends on the retailer’s preference for consumer surplus. At this time, as the retailer’s preference for consumer surplus increases, the manufacturer will choose not to engage in channel encroachment. But when consumers are more sensitive to green investment levels, manufacturers will always choose channel encroachment.

Key words: manufacturer encroachment, green investment, retailer dual targeting, consumer surplus