固定经营期下基于运行绩效的PPP项目服务价格形成机制研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2019.0185

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文研究PPP项目价格形成机制、补偿机制及其社会效率。首先,分析了招投标制度下固定经营期PPP项目服务价格形成机制及其不足。其次,基于成本与运行绩效的PPP项目定价规制及可行性缺口补贴思想,建立模型分析实施机构可观察PPP项目服务成本时的定价水平和可行性缺口补贴标准;当实施机构无法准确掌握项目公司的运行成本时,通过制度设计诱导社会投资者上报真实的运行成本和运行绩效以获得最大净现值。分析表明,当PPP项目服务需求弹性较大同时有可行性缺口补贴政策时,政府进行价格规制时项目净现值高于不规制时的净现值。文章通过实例验证了成本信息是否可观察两种情形下PPP项目的服务价格水平、运行绩效、项目投资净现值及消费者剩余。为了避免PPP项目运行绩效下降和社会福利损失,政府应建立科学的监督激励机制,依据PPP项目服务成本与运行绩效的信息确定固定特许经营期下项目服务价格和可行性缺口补贴额度。

关键词: PPP项目, 运行绩效, 价格形成机制, 补偿机制, 消费者剩余

Abstract: In this paper, a model is built to research the pricing formation mechanism , compensation mechanism and social efficiency in public project in public private partnership. Firstly, this paper analyzes the service price bidding price principle under the fixed concessionary period and its shortcomings. Secondly, since government constitutes public project controlled price feasibility gap subsidy according to the cost and operational performance of project company,we establish a model to analyze the pricing level and the feasibility gap subsidy standard when implementing agencies can observe the service cost of PPP projects, induce social investors to report the real operating cost and operating performance through system design to obtain the maximum net present value when the implementing agency cannot accurately grasp the operating cost of the project company. The analysis shows that the net present value of a project is higher than that when the government does not regulate price; when the demand for project services is flexible, the contract stipulates to subsidize the feasibility gap of the project company. Some conclusions on PPP mode service price, operational performance, consumer surplus, private enterprise’s profits and social efficiency in different cost information and controlled condition are analyzed and verified. For the sake of avoiding the decrease of operational performance and loss of social welfare, government should establish scientific monitoring prompting mechanism,determine the service price and feasibility gap subsidy amount based on the information of supply cost and operational performance.

Key words: PPP mode, operational performance, pricing formation mechanism, compensation mechanism, consumer surplus

中图分类号:

F271
C931

何寿奎. 固定经营期下基于运行绩效的PPP项目服务价格形成机制研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(8): 141-149.

HE Shou-kui. Service Pricing Formation Mechanismof PPP Project Under the Fixed Concessionary Period[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(8): 141-149.

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