基于演化博弈的PPP项目运营期政府监管方式选择研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2019.0091

摘要/Abstract

摘要： PPP项目运营期内,投资者可能为了追求私利而采取投机行为。针对这种投机行为,本文从监管的角度,运用演化博弈理论分析了政府监管方式策略选择问题。本文将监管方式分为两类:过程监管和结果监管。结果表明,政府监管部门的策略选择与监管部门结果监管时能够识别投机行为的概率有关。以投资者投机所得的“价值”为标准,当结果监管识别投机行为的概率小于投资者采取机会主义所得的“价值”时,双方最终的策略选择为(不采取机会主义行为,结果监管);相反,则双方之间不存在一组进化稳定策略,博弈的最终结果与双方的收益以及系统所处的初始状态有关。此外,本文还讨论了不同参数变化对双方行为策略选择的影响,为政府监管方式的选择提供参考,以期最大程度抑制机会主义行为。

关键词: PPP项目, 机会主义行为, 政府过程监管, 政府结果监管, 演化博弈

Abstract: During the operational period of PPP projects, private investors may engage in opportunistic behavior to pursue self-interest. In order to curb this kind of behavior, this paper analyzes the selection of government supervision mode based on the evolutionary game theory from the perspective of the government supervision. The supervision mode is classified into two types, process-and outcome-oriented supervision. The results show that the supervision mode by the governmental supervision institutions is related to the probability of identifying investors’ speculation through outcome-oriented supervision. When this probability is less than the ratio of the net profit to penalty obtained by investors, the equilibrium strategy of these two parties is (not to engage in opportunistic behavior, government outcome-oriented supervision). In contrast, there is no one evolutionarily stable strategies(ESS), and at this time the ultimate choice correlates with the initial state and their payoffs. Moreover, the effects of different parameters to the equilibrium strategy are discussed, providing a reference for decision-making of governmental supervision institutions and investors.

Key words: government process-oriented supervision, government outcome-oriented supervision, evolutionary game theory

中图分类号:

F282

高若兰,鲍琴. 基于演化博弈的PPP项目运营期政府监管方式选择研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(4): 155-162.

GAO Ruo-lan, BAO Qin. Selection of Government Supervision Mode during the Operational Period in PPP Projects based on Evolutionary Game Theory[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(4): 155-162.

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