关键词: PPP项目, 政府补偿机制, 公平偏好, 风险偏好, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: Based on the comprehensive consideration of the risk preference and fairness preference of social capital, this paper constructs a Stackelberg game model between government and social capital, to analyzes the optimum design of government compensation mechanism under the influence of risk preference and fairness preference. The research shows that the optimal investment level of social capital is negatively correlated with risk preference and positively correlated with the degree of fairness preference. The optimal design of the government compensation mechanism should be based on the consideration of the single-phase the risk and the fair premium cost, and the government should estimate the relative operating profit of the single-phase, and then coordinate the annual construction cost compensation and the operating period compensation coefficient to design optimal annual construction cost compensation and the optimal operating period compensation coefficient.

Key words: PPP project, government compensation mechanism, fairness preference, risk preference, stackelberg game