基于经销商再制造的闭环供应链政府补贴策略及效果分析

doi:10.12005/orms.2021.0048

运筹与管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (2): 102-109.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2021.0048

基于经销商再制造的闭环供应链政府补贴策略及效果分析

狄卫民¹, 徐文君¹, 夏西强²

1.郑州大学管理工程学院,河南郑州 450001;
2.郑州大学商学院,河南郑州 450001

收稿日期:2019-04-10 出版日期:2021-02-25
通讯作者: 夏西强(1984-),男,河南周口人,副教授,博士,研究方向:博弈分析、绿色供应链管理。
作者简介:狄卫民(1970-),男,山东嘉祥人,副教授,博士,研究方向:物流系统优化;徐文君(1995-),女,河南新乡人,硕士研究生,研究方向:物流与供应链管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71702174);郑州大学管理工程学院创新发展基金项目(20170601)

Government Subsidy Strategy and Effect Analysis of Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on Distributor Remanufacturing

DI Wei-min¹, XU Wen-jun¹, XIA Xi-qiang²

1. School of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China;
2. School of Business, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China

Received:2019-04-10 Online:2021-02-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对制造商负责再制造设计,经销商负责再制造的闭环供应链系统,建立政府无补贴、补贴经销商再制造和补贴制造商再制造设计3种策略下的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析不同补贴策略对供应链成员企业决策的影响。同时,应用数值仿真方法研究相同补贴支出下两种补贴策略的优劣。结果表明:相对于无补贴策略,两种补贴策略均会降低再制品和新产品的销售价格,提高再制品销售量,提升再制造设计水平,并且在再制品需求量小于新产品需求量时均会降低新产品销售量,在再制品和新产品的需求量相等时均会提高新产品销售量;另外,在相同的补贴支出下,当新产品需求量大于再制品需求量时,补贴经销商更能降低两种产品的销售价格和新产品的销售量,提高再制品销售量和制造商与经销商的利润,补贴制造商则更能提升再制造设计水平。

关键词: 再制造设计, 政府补贴, Stackelberg博弈, 经销商再制造

Abstract: For a closed-loop supply chain in which manufacturers design remanufacturing and in turn distributors plan remanufacturing, three Stackelberg game models under three strategies, namely, no government subsidy, subsidy for distributor to remanufacture and subsidy for manufacturer to remanufacture design, are established respectively, and the effects of different subsidy strategies on the decision-making of supply chain members are analyzed. Moreover, the advantages and disadvantages of different subsidy strategies under the same subsidy amount are analyzed through numerical simulations. The results show that compared with no subsidy strategy, the two subsidy strategies may reduce the selling prices of both new and remanufactured products, increase the sales of remanufactured products and improve the manufacturer's remanufacturing design level, as well as decrease the sales of new products when the demand of remanufactured product is less than that of new products and increase the sales when the two demands are equal; additionally, in the case of the demand of remanufactured products less than that of new products and under the same government subsidy amount, the subsidizing distributor strategy may lower the selling prices of some items such as both new and remanufactured products and the sales of new products, and also raise ones of other items such as remanufactured products and the profits of both the manufacturer and distributor, while the subsidizing manufacturer strategy further prompts the manufacturer's remanufacturing design level.

Key words: remanufacturing design, government subsidy, Stackelberg game, distributor remanufacturing

中图分类号:

F272.3

狄卫民, 徐文君, 夏西强. 基于经销商再制造的闭环供应链政府补贴策略及效果分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(2): 102-109.

DI Wei-min, XU Wen-jun, XIA Xi-qiang. Government Subsidy Strategy and Effect Analysis of Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on Distributor Remanufacturing[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2021, 30(2): 102-109.

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基于经销商再制造的闭环供应链政府补贴策略及效果分析

Government Subsidy Strategy and Effect Analysis of Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on Distributor Remanufacturing

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