关键词: 供应链管理, 企业社会责任, 风险规避, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: This paper studies the equilibrium pricing decisions of supply chain for a risk-averse manufacturer with corporate social responsibility and two risk-averse competitive retailers. The impacts of supply chain player’s risk aversion, the rival market demand uncertainty and correlation, the manufacturer’s corporate social responsibility level on equilibrium pricing are discussed using Stackelberg game model. The research shows that when the manufacturer takes corporate social responsibility, the effect of risk aversion on supply chain decision-making will depend on the level of corporate social responsibility. When market uncertainty or demand correlation is higher, the manufacturer with higher corporate social responsibility level will provide lower wholesale price. At this time, the retail price decreases with a high level of corporate social responsibility while the consumer welfare increases. When the cost of product is low, consumer welfare increases with the corporate social responsibility level. When the cost of product is high, consumer welfare always decreases.

Key words: supply chain management, corporate social responsibility, risk aversion, Stackelberg game