基于公私不同风险偏好的PPP项目政府补偿机制研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2017.0278

运筹与管理 ›› 2017, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (11): 190-199.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2017.0278

• 管理科学 • 上一篇

基于公私不同风险偏好的PPP项目政府补偿机制研究

杜杨^1,2, 丰景春^1,3,4

1.河海大学商学院,江苏南京 211100;
2.金陵科技学院,江苏南京 211169;
3.江苏省”世界水谷”与水生态文明协同创新中心,江苏南京 211100;
4.河海大学项目管理研究所,江苏南京 211100;

收稿日期:2015-07-15 出版日期:2017-11-25
作者简介:杜杨 ( 1979-) ,男,江苏靖江,讲师,博士研究生,主要研究方向为工程管理、(PPP)项目决策与治理、博弈论及其应用;丰景春(1963-),男,浙江人,教授,博导,河海大学商学院院长助理。
基金资助:
国家社科基金重点项目(14AZD024);金陵科技学院科研基金资助项目(jit-n-201516);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2013B15020062,2014B09014);国家社科基金青年项目(15CJL023);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2015B08214)

Government’ s Compensation Mechanism for PPP Project Based On Risk Preference

DU Yang^1,2,4, FENG Jing-chun^1,3,4

1.Business School,Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China;
2.College of Civil Engineering, Jinling Institute of Technology, Nanjing 210098, China;
3.Jiangsu Provincial Collaborative Innovation Center of World Water Valley and Water ecological civilization, Nanjing 211100, China;
4.Institute of Project Management of Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China;

Received:2015-07-15 Online:2017-11-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文在考虑双方风险偏好差异的基础上,围绕PPP项目补偿问题构建了公私双方的Stackelberg博弈模型,从集中决策和分散决策协调的角度研究了PPP项目的补偿机制。研究表明,在公私双方存在风险厌恶时,直接补贴契约无法诱导私人投资者做出符合整体最优的决策。因此,本文设计了一种基于政府部分承担建设投资的混合补偿契约改进前补贴模式。分析表明,当建设投资分担比例合适时,混合补偿契约可以协调风险厌恶下的PPP补偿博弈的分散决策和集中决策,实现Pareto改进。最后,通过数值分析进一步研究了补偿契约的影响因素和适用范围。

关键词: PPP项目, 风险偏好, 政府补偿, 协调机制

Abstract: Considering the different risk preference between the public and the private, the government’s compensation coordination mechanism of PPP project are respectively studied on the the centralization decision-making Stackelberg game and decentralization decision. The research results show that the private can not be induced to make a decision in accordance with optimization of whole project by a direct compensation in risk aversion model. Then a hybrid contract is proposed for this problem and government will share a part of construction investment in this contract. And the analysis shows that this contract can coordinate the centralization and decentralization decision when the proportion of government construction investment is suitable. Finally, a numerical analysis is presented to further illustrate the theoretical analysis results.

Key words: PPP project, risk preference, government’s compensation, coordination mechanism

中图分类号:

C939

杜杨, 丰景春. 基于公私不同风险偏好的PPP项目政府补偿机制研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(11): 190-199.

DU Yang, FENG Jing-chun. Government’ s Compensation Mechanism for PPP Project Based On Risk Preference[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(11): 190-199.

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基于公私不同风险偏好的PPP项目政府补偿机制研究

Government’ s Compensation Mechanism for PPP Project Based On Risk Preference

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