带有解聘补偿机制的过度自信高管动态激励契约设计研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2020.0217

运筹与管理 ›› 2020, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (8): 202-212.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2020.0217

带有解聘补偿机制的过度自信高管动态激励契约设计研究

刘新民^1,2, 蔺康康¹, 王垒³, 郑润佳⁴

1.山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛 266590;
2.青岛农业大学管理学院,山东青岛 266109;
3.中国海洋大学经济学院,山东青岛 266100;
4.山东科技大学数学与系统科学学院,山东青岛 266590

收稿日期:2018-05-02 出版日期:2020-08-25
通讯作者: 王垒(1986-),男,山东淄博人,副教授,硕士生导师,工学博士,管理学博士后,研究方向:公司治理与决策;
作者简介:刘新民(1965-),男,山东莒南人,教授,博士生导师,管理学博士,研究方向:组织治理与系统决策;蔺康康(1994-),男,山东临沂人,博士生,研究方向:公司治理;郑润佳(1992-),男,山东莒南人,硕士,研究方向:公司治理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71371111);国家社科规划青年项目(18CGL009);山东省自然科学基金青年项目(ZR2019QG005);山东科技大学科研创新团队(2015TDJH103);山东省社会科学规划研究项目(18CCXJ15)

Dynamic Incentive Contract for Overconfident Executive with Dismissal Compensation Mechanism

LIU Xin-min^1,2, LIN Kang-kang¹, WANG Lei³, ZHENG Run-jia⁴

1. College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590,China;
2. School of Management, Qingdao Agricultural University, Qingdao 266109,China;
3. School of Economics, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100,China;
4. College of Mathematics and Systems Science, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China

Received:2018-05-02 Online:2020-08-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 考虑具有双边道德风险的委托代理问题,将解聘补偿和过度自信同时引入公司高管的激励契约,构建带有解聘补偿机制的过度自信高管动态激励模型,研究委托人解聘倾向对过度自信高管激励合同设计的影响。结果表明:委托人解聘倾向与高管的过度自信水平呈U型关系,高管代理人努力水平与高管的过度自信水平呈倒U型关系,适度的自信水平能够降低委托人的解聘倾向以及提高高管的努力水平;在引入解聘机制的情境下,解聘补偿能够有效抑制委托人的道德风险,降低委托人的解聘倾向,增加高管两期的努力水平;随着聘期的增加,高管第二期的努力水平低于第一期,委托人第二期的解聘倾向高于第一期;两个合同期内的补偿机制相互影响,表现在第二期的解聘补偿提高了委托人第一期的解聘倾向,导致高管第一期努力水平的下降,而第一期的解聘补偿提高了高管在第二期继续留任的可能性,从而增加了高管和委托人在第二期的期望收益。研究结论对我国企业高管薪酬改革以及长期激励合同设计具有一定的理论参考价值。

关键词: 解聘补偿机制, 过度自信, 双边道德风险, 动态委托代理模型, 契约设计

Abstract: Considering the principal-agent problem with bilateral moral hazards, this paper introduces dismissal compensation mechanism and executive's overconfidence behavior, and analyzes the impact of agent's overconfidence behavior and the dismissal compensation on the incentive contract by a two-stage dynamic incentive model. This study reveals that there is a U-shape relation between executive's overconfidence and the principal's dismissal tendency, also an inverted U-shape relation between executive's overconfidence and the agent's effort, which means that moderate executive's overconfidence can reduce principal's dismissal tendency and promote their own efforts. By introducing the dismissal mechanism,the compensation can effectively restrain the moral hazard of the principal, reduce the principal's dismissal tendency and increase the agent's effort. Executive's effort in the second phase is lower than that in the first phase, while the principal's dismissal tendency is higher. The compensation mechanisms in the two contract periods interact with each other, which shows that the dismissal compensation in the second phase improves the principal's dismissal tendency in the first phase, and leads to the decline of agent's efforts in the first phase, while the dismissal compensation in the first phase increases the possibility of the executive to remain in office, thus increasing the expected revenues of the executives and the principal in the second phase. The conclusion has a certain theoretical reference value for the reform of executive compensation and the design of long-term incentive contract in Chinese enterprises.

Key words: dismissal compensation mechanism, overconfidence, bilateral moral hazard, dynamic principal-agent model, contract design

中图分类号:

F271

刘新民, 蔺康康, 王垒, 郑润佳. 带有解聘补偿机制的过度自信高管动态激励契约设计研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(8): 202-212.

LIU Xin-min, LIN Kang-kang, WANG Lei, ZHENG Run-jia. Dynamic Incentive Contract for Overconfident Executive with Dismissal Compensation Mechanism[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(8): 202-212.

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带有解聘补偿机制的过度自信高管动态激励契约设计研究

Dynamic Incentive Contract for Overconfident Executive with Dismissal Compensation Mechanism

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