关键词: 代理人, 激励机制, 过度自信, 长短期努力, 相对净收益

Abstract: This paper regarded “relative net profit” as performance measurement standards to design agent’s compensation contracts. It established non-monetary utility measurement models and agent’s optimal incentive model to explore the influence of various factors on agent’s effort and performance share proportion, which took into account agent’s overconfidence degree and his long-term and short-term effort, distinguished the conflict and non-conflict between short-term effort and long-term effort. It found four major conclusions as follows: First, agents in monopoly industries make less effort than ones in competitive industries and the greater the monopoly earnings proportion is, the less effort agents make. Second, the relationship between monopoly earnings proportion and performance share ratio is affected by overconfidence degree of agents and clients, that the greater the monopoly earnings proportion is, the higher the performance share proportion is when agent’s overconfidence coefficient is higher than principal’s, on the contrary, the conclusion is opposite when agent’s overconfidence coefficient is lower than principal’s. Third, the higher the agent’s overconfidence degree to favorable condition and the lower to unfavorable position is, the greater the agent’s effort and performance share proportion are; the higher the principal’s overconfidence degree to favorable condition and the lower to unfavorable position is, the lower the agent’s effort and performance share proportion are. Four, agent’s effort is positive correlation with marginal non-monetary income and displays negative correlation with marginal non-monetary cost.

Key words: agent, incentive mechanism, overconfidence, long-term and short-term effort, relative net profit