关键词: 服务外包, 激励机制, 客户参与, 专用性资产投入水平

Abstract: It is difficult for the client participation, as well as the service vendor’s effort level and the specific assets investment level of cooperation between the two sides to make an effective verification in service outsourcing, which may lead to moral hazard, and reduce the service outsourcing performance, and even lead to the failure of service outsourcing. In view of this, the client’s participation degree and the vendor’s asset specificity investment level which influence the design of incentive contract are analyzed from the perspective of establishing a service outsourcing principal agent framework and optimization theory, and they have been verified by using numerical simulation. The results indicate that, when the client puts more efforts in the service outsourcing cooperative production, the client incentive for service vendor will increase but the increase rate is slow, and the service vendor’s efforts will be accelerated to improve; when vendor’s asset specificity investment level is higher, its level of effort will also accelerate and meanwhile, the client will increase the growth of the incentive coefficient. When the specific assets investment level reaches a certain level, the growth rate reaches the maximum incentive coefficient.

Key words: service outsourcing, incentive mechanism, client participation, asset specificity investment level