关键词: 公司+农户, 委托代理, 租赁, 信息不对称, 激励机制

Abstract: In view of the default problems between company and farmers, this paper builds the “company+farmer” leasing model based on the principal-agent theory, which is made up of the risk averse company and farmers. Setting strategy of the incentive coefficient and rent of the model is analyzed under the condition of asymmetric information. The impact of parameter change on the incentive coefficient and rent is discussed through the numerical simulation. The research results show that the higher the sharing ratio of the company to the farmers, the higher the level of farmers’ production effort. Meanwhile, the lower the rent paid by the company to the farmers in the early stage, the higher the sharing ratio to the farmers latter. In addition, the incentive coefficient increases with the increase of the company’s risk aversion coefficient and the farmers' production capacity, and decreases with the increase of the farmers’ risk aversion coefficient and the exogenous uncertain factors. The rent increases with the farmers’ risk aversion coefficient and production capacity, and decreases with company’s the risk aversion coefficient and exogenous uncertain factors. Moreover, there exist optimal market prices that make the rent lowest.

Key words: company+farmer, leasing model, principal-agent theory, information asymmetry, incentive mechanism