关键词: 燃煤发电区域政府, 可再生能源发电商, 减排补贴, 委托代理, 激励效应

Abstract: In view of prominent contradiction of the traditional emission reduction subsidy incentive policy, this paper analyzes how the government effectively designs and optimizes the emission reduction subsidy policy from the perspective of incentive compatibility constraint and participation constraint condition. On this basis, the incentive effect of the government' s optimal emission reduction subsidy policy under different circumstances is numerically analyzed: Firstly, based on the maximum emission reduction of optimal power generation, the maximum critical value and minimum critical value of the government' s equilibrium coefficient for social welfare of increasing environmental economic benefits and saving electricity and coal consumption are determined under the condition that the emission reduction level is sensitive to the intensity of electricity production. Secondly, the rationality and reliability of the negative incentive effect of emission reduction subsidy policy under the condition of strong or weak sensitivity are analyzed based on the optimal benefit of the power generators with the critical minimum value as the benchmark. Finally, based on the cost analysis of the government' s optimal emission reduction subsidy, this paper analyzes the positive incentive effect of emission reduction subsidy policy on power generators under the sensitive condition of strength and weakness. The conclusion of this study provides decision-making basis and management enlightenment for the governments of coal-fired power generation regions to scientifically guide renewable energy generators to participate in emission reduction cooperation actively and formulate effective emission reduction subsidy incentive policies.

Key words: regional governments for coal-fired power generation, renewable energy generators, emission reduction subsidies, principal agent, incentive effect