既有建筑合同能源管理中的政府角色——基于模糊Shapley值的研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2020.0218

运筹与管理 ›› 2020, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (8): 213-221.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2020.0218

既有建筑合同能源管理中的政府角色——基于模糊Shapley值的研究

刘惠敏^1,2, 檀灵慧¹, 胡梦月¹, 秦俊杰¹, 褚海涛¹

1.同济大学经济与管理学院,上海 200092;
2.同济大学设施管理研究院,上海 200092

收稿日期:2019-06-12 出版日期:2020-08-25
作者简介:刘惠敏(1979-),女,吉林人,副教授,硕士生导师,博士,研究方向:大型基础设施社会影响评价。
基金资助:
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(18YJC630095);国家自然科学基金资助项目(青年面上连续资助)(71373007)

The Role of Government in Energy Performance Contracting forBuilding Retrofits —— AnalysisBased on Fuzzy Shapley Value

LIU Hui-min^1,2, TAN Ling-hui¹, HU Meng-yue¹, QIN Jun-jie¹, CHU Hai-tao¹

1. School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China;
2. Tongji Yabaite Institute of Facility Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China

Received:2019-06-12 Online:2020-08-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 通过合同能源管理模式进行建筑节能改造,节能收益的分配问题比传统模式复杂。而节能改造的外部性导致利益相关者主动参与意愿不强,阻碍合同能源管理模式的发展。研究以合同能源管理模式中的能源费用托管型为例,基于利益相关者的利己性和逐利性,采用模糊区间Shapley值方法,构建核心利益相关者(建筑业主、节能服务公司和金融机构)的节能收益分配模型;分析建筑节能改造的外部性特征,运用系统动力学厘清合同能源管理模式产生的非节能收益(经济、环境、社会),形成全部利益相关者的因果关系正负反馈回路;尝试将政府纳入分配机制中,构建新的合同能源管理收益分配模型,有助于提高核心利益相关者的综合收益;提出政府不应仅仅为了完成节能目标来鼓励节能改造项目,更应优化建筑节能改造的外部环境。

关键词: 合同能源管理, 模糊区间Shapley值, 外部性, 利益相关者, 政府

Abstract: The distribution of benefits from building energy-saving transformationthrough the model of energy performance contracting is more complex than the traditional model. However, the externality of energy-saving transformation leads to the weak willingness of stakeholders to participate actively, which hinders the development of contract energy management model. Taking Energy Costs Hosting Model as an example, based on the self-interest and profit of stakeholders, this paper uses the method of fuzzy interval Shapley value to establish the energy-saving benefits distribution model of core stakeholders including building owners, energy-saving service companies and financial institutions. Then, it analyzes the externalities of building energy-saving transformation and applies system dynamics to clarify the non-energy-saving benefits(economy, environment and society)produced by energy performance contracting, and forms the positive and negative feedback loop of causality among all stakeholders. Government is brought into the distribution mechanism to construct a new benefits distribution model, which is helpful to improve the comprehensive benefits of the core stakeholders. It is pointed out that the government should not only encourage energy-saving transformation projects in order to achieve the energy-saving goal, but also promote the external environment of building energy-saving transformation.

Key words: energy performance contracting, fuzzy interval Shapley value, externality, stakeholders, government

中图分类号:

F206
F224.32

刘惠敏, 檀灵慧, 胡梦月, 秦俊杰, 褚海涛. 既有建筑合同能源管理中的政府角色——基于模糊Shapley值的研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(8): 213-221.

LIU Hui-min, TAN Ling-hui, HU Meng-yue, QIN Jun-jie, CHU Hai-tao. The Role of Government in Energy Performance Contracting forBuilding Retrofits —— AnalysisBased on Fuzzy Shapley Value[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(8): 213-221.

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既有建筑合同能源管理中的政府角色——基于模糊Shapley值的研究

The Role of Government in Energy Performance Contracting forBuilding Retrofits —— AnalysisBased on Fuzzy Shapley Value

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