推广成本信息不对称下推广商与酒店间的合作契约设计

doi:10.12005/orms.2017.0103

运筹与管理 ›› 2017, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (5): 14-20.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2017.0103

推广成本信息不对称下推广商与酒店间的合作契约设计

周永务, 胡树安

华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州 510640

收稿日期:2015-05-11 出版日期:2017-05-25
作者简介:周永务(1964-),男,安徽庐江人,教授、博士,主要从事库存控制与优化,供应链管理等研究。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目 (71371075);教育部人文社科青年项目(15YJC630053);安徽省高等学校自然科学研究重点项目(KJ2015A335)

Coordination Contract Design for Hotel and Promoter Under Asymmetric Promotion Cost Information

ZHOU Yong-wu, HU Shu-an

School of Business and Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510640, China

Received:2015-05-11 Online:2017-05-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为应对日趋激烈的酒店市场竞争、加强对销售渠道的控制,酒店急需与推广商合作以提高自有销售网站的需求水平。文章基于推广成本信息不对称,构建了一个占主导的酒店和一家推广商关于需求推广合作的博弈模型,分析了信息不对称情形下推广商的谎报动机,指出合作契约设计的必要性。并提出一套契约菜单,在保证推广商依据自身实际成本类型进行契约选择的前提下,实现了酒店利润的最大化。最后通过算例分析,验证了所设计的合作契约的有效性,并给出了参数灵敏性分析。

关键词: 酒店, 需求推广, 信息不对称, 契约设计

Abstract: To cope with the increasing competition of hotels and strengthen the control of sales channels,there is an urgent need for hotels to improve the demand in their own sales website. Based on asymmetric promotion cost information,we develop a game model on demand promotion cooperation between a dominant hotel and a promoter,analyse the promoter's incentive of misreporting and point out the necessity of contract design. We propose a contract menu which can maximize profit of hotel and make the promoter choose the contract that is designed for his type. Finally we validate the effectiveness of this contract and show the sensitivity analysis of parameters through numerical examples.

Key words: hotel, demand promotion, asymmetric information, contract design

中图分类号:

F272.3

周永务, 胡树安. 推广成本信息不对称下推广商与酒店间的合作契约设计[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(5): 14-20.

ZHOU Yong-wu, HU Shu-an. Coordination Contract Design for Hotel and Promoter Under Asymmetric Promotion Cost Information[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(5): 14-20.

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推广成本信息不对称下推广商与酒店间的合作契约设计

Coordination Contract Design for Hotel and Promoter Under Asymmetric Promotion Cost Information

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