关键词: 供应链金融, 保兑仓融资, 需求信息不对称, 信息风险, 信息显示机制

Abstract: Information asymmetry risk widely exists in the process of confirmed warehouse financing. This paper depicts relationship of the financing system members by using the Stackelberg game model, and uses dynamic programming and other optimization methods to solve the corresponding equilibrium decision. Three kinds of demand information asymmetry situations—information fraud, information superiority, and information hiding are summarized. We also analyze the impact of different information asymmetry cases on the financing system, and further put forward the screening contract mechanism to achieve the information display. The results show that: Retailers can get high advantage from the information asymmetry, which also brings damage to the other financing participants. Information hiding does higher damage to the manufacturer. The two-part tariff contract can realize information screening, but the manufacturer has to pay information rent for it, which causes efficiency loss of the financing system. The two-part tariff with repurchase mechanism under reasonable parameter setting helps to further improve the interest of the financing system, even can reach the secondary coordination state, and realizes Pareto improvement of the financing system members. This paper provides the theoretical reference and decision basis for controlling information risk and improving financing efficiency of the supply chain finance.

Key words: supply chain finance, confirmed warehouse financing, demand information asymmetry, information risk, information screening mechanism