关键词: PPP项目, 协同行为, 稳定策略, 演化博弈

Abstract: In public-private partnership(PPP)projects, the government and private investors may engage in collaborative behavior to pursue interest. This makes necessary the study of government and private investors' collaborative behavior in order to gain the understanding of the underlying mechanisms towards enhancing project performance. At first, the dynamic evolutionary procedure of project investors'choice of strategies is analyzed based on an evolutionary game model, in which the government and private investors could nearly choose interactions as their optimal strategy. Secondly, from the perspective of evolutionary game model(EGT), the results show that the evolution of the government and private investors' collaborative behavior has multiple equilibrium in payoff matrix, and the evolutionary stable strategies(ESS)are largely influenced by the initial organization states and mutual incentive situations of both the regulatory system. Furthermore, the equilibrium solution of the game is discussed to find an effective way to strengthen collaborative behavior which would improve the mechanism of benefit coordination by investors under different situations.

Key words: PPP projects, collaborative behavior, evolutionary stable strategies(ESS), evolutionary game