关键词: 前景理论, 区块链通证, 协同合作, 演化博弈

Abstract: In the age of the knowledge economy, online communities serve as quintessential crowd-sourcing platforms, fostering the emergence of collective wisdom and knowledge sharing that effectively propels open collaboration in knowledge innovation. Traditional social media platforms, mainly built on centralized organizational structures, inherently harbor numerous issues such as user privacy breaches, disparities between user contributions and earnings, and a dearth of efficacious incentive mechanisms. On one hand, conventional centralized platforms store all user data on centralized servers, thereby permitting platform administrators to exploit or sell this data for profit without user consent. On the other hand, user-generated content’s rights and benefits should naturally belong to creators, but most centralized platforms commodify user contributions while users receive negligible gains or no share of them. Furthermore, the uniform incentive mechanisms tend to conform to the “90-9-1” rule in community knowledge contributions, substantially dampening the enthusiasm of users for sharing high-quality knowledge.
The ascendance of blockchain technology has catalyzed a shift in organizational paradigms, giving rise to the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO), a new form that addresses the knowledge governance limitations of conventional centralized communities. Hsieh characterizes blockchain-based autonomous organizations (hereinafter referred to as blockchain autonomous organizations) as entities capable of functioning autonomously devoid of centralized control or third-party intervention. Steemitis the most representative of blockchain autonomous organizations, having devised an incentive mechanism encompassing three underlying tokens. This structure dispenses token rewards and community privileges impartially to users who contribute to community development, encompassing knowledge creation, sharing, and dissemination. Contrasting with conventional knowledge communities, the Steemit community leverages the token’s value traits and governance capacities, not only augmenting anticipated user benefits but also conferring community governance rights. This strategy directly achieves knowledge realization and spurs user participation in collaborative knowledge sharing on a material level.
The decision-making process for users engaged in knowledge sharing entails intricate dynamics, with cooperative behavior contingent upon external influences. Given that token incentives underpin a dynamic reward mechanism within community user groups’collaborative cooperation, the variability of anticipated returns yields divergent perceptions of gains and losses among economically rational agents. Traditional evolutionary game models fall short in comprehensively explaining irrational psychological factors and knowledge sharing actors’expectations of income. Prospect theory, capable of effectively analyzing knowledge sharing subjects’decision-making within uncertain contexts and their preferences for gains and losses, is harnessed here to enhance the game income matrix for knowledge sharing subjects. This study probes the evolutionary stability strategies of user sharing behavior within blockchain autonomous organizations, scrutinizing their influence on user knowledge sharing choices through simulations and analyses of various parameter variables, and ultimately furnishing pertinent management recommendations.
Simulation reveals that users’willingness to partake in knowledge sharing and collaborative cooperation is significantly influenced by factors like token rewards, their distribution coefficient, and sharing costs. Notably, knowledge creators’perceived risks exert substantial sway over sharing strategies, whereas mutual potential benefits exert a relatively minor impact. Conclusively, this paper’s research insights provide actionable suggestions for the wholesome development of blockchain autonomous organizations. Future endeavors will extend this study to explore the ramifications of token incentives on user conduct within blockchain autonomous organizations based on the conclusions drawn herein.

Key words: prospect theory, blockchain token, collaborative cooperation, evolutionary game