运筹与管理 ›› 2023, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (11): 183-190.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2023.0370

• 数字经济时代的机制设计与监管治理 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑协同税收监管的云制造平台知识交互演化机制研究

钟琦, 王红雪   

  1. 东北财经大学 管理科学与工程学院,辽宁 大连 116025
  • 收稿日期:2022-07-31 出版日期:2023-11-25 发布日期:2024-01-30
  • 作者简介:钟琦(1978-),女,四川宜宾人,副教授,博士,硕士生导师,研究方向:创新管理,创新生态系统;王红雪(1997-),女,辽宁庄河人,硕士研究生,研究方向:平台生态系统。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71801033,71972028);辽宁省教育厅科研项目(LJKR0464)

Research on Knowledge Interaction and Evolution Mechanism of Cloud Manufacturing Platform Considering Collaborative Tax Supervision

ZHONG Qi, WANG Hongxue   

  1. School of Management Science and Engineering, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, China
  • Received:2022-07-31 Online:2023-11-25 Published:2024-01-30

摘要: 云制造平台通过主体间知识交互实现制造资源的协同共享,是提高制造企业创新能力的动力和源泉。面对平台规范监管的现实需求,在政府-平台协同监管情境下展开对云制造平台主体间知识交互演化机制的研究具有重要的理论价值和实践意义。本文在构建云制造平台体系架构基础上,同时考虑积极知识交互与消极知识隐匿行为,建立云制造平台、云提供商、政府三方动态演化博弈模型,分析三方主体行为策略选择和演化路径。基于MATLAB进行模型仿真分析,进一步探讨税收监管、知识交互成本及收益、网络外部性等内外部因素对云制造平台知识交互策略演化的影响。研究结果表明,(1)与其他因素相比,知识交互成本与知识交互收益对云提供商知识交互策略选择影响最为显著,知识交互意愿随知识交互成本提高而降低,随知识交互收益提高而升高。(2)政府积极监管成本越大,云提供商选择积极知识交互策略的意愿越高;而政府对平台披露涉税信息的奖励对云制造商知识交互意愿影响较小。(3)网络外部性对于云制造平台、云提供商和政府三方策略选择都产生正向影响,其中对于云提供商采取知识交互策略的影响最为显著。

关键词: 云制造平台, 协同监管, 知识交互, 演化博弈

Abstract: The cloud manufacturing platform achieves collaborative resource sharing among agents through knowledge interaction, which is the power and source to improve the innovation ability of manufacturing enterprises. At the same time, influenced by the complex characteristics of platform network externality and mobility, regional differences in tax systems, incomplete tax knowledge systems of cloud providers, and a relatively weak awareness of taxation have gradually become prominent issues. Many tax-related pieces of information are inaccessible to tax authorities, making it difficult to establish effective oversight. How to obtain complete tax-related information from cloud providers has become an important part to ensure the continuous and healthy development of cloud manufacturing platforms, and it is also the most significant challenge in tax supervision of platforms.
The cloud manufacturing platform can obtain relevant data and information related to all business links of cloud providers. The disclosure of tax-related information by the platform can effectively reduce the management costs and provide a solid foundation for effective supervision by tax authorities. At the same time, tax-related information disclosure will also have an impact on the collaborative and knowledge interaction between the cloud manufacturing platform and cloud providers. Therefore, how to disclose tax-related information on the cloud manufacturing platform, help the government to improve tax supervision, ensure the willingness of cloud providers to interact with knowledge and enhance the overall performance of the cloud manufacturing platform, has become a practical issue in the development of cloud manufacturing platforms and an important subject that academia needs to further explore. In the face of the practical need for platform regulation and supervision, it is of great theoretical value and practical significance to study the evolution mechanism of knowledge interaction among the entities of cloud manufacturing platforms under the government-platform collaborative supervision.
Based on the cloud manufacturing platform with strong network externalities, this paper introduces the knowledge gap theory and social interdependence theory. It takes into account factors such as the revenue of network externalities and taxes and fees. It builds upon the architecture of the cloud manufacturing platform and simultaneously considers both positive knowledge interaction and negative knowledge concealment behaviors. It establishes a dynamic evolutionary game model involving three parties: the cloud manufacturing platform, cloud providers, and the government, to analyze the behavioral strategies and evolutionary paths of the three-party. Using MATLAB for model simulation and analysis, the article further investigates the impact of internal and external factors such as tax regulation, knowledge interaction costs and benefits, and network externalities on the evolution of knowledge interaction strategies within the cloud manufacturing platform.
The research findings indicate that: (1)In comparison to other factors, the cost of knowledge interaction and the benefits of knowledge interaction have the most significant impact on the choice of knowledge interaction strategies of cloud providers. The willingness for knowledge interaction decreases as the cost of knowledge interaction increases, and it increases with the benefits of knowledge interaction income. (2)The greater the cost of active government regulation, the higher the willingness of cloud providers to choose active knowledge interaction strategies. However, the government’s reward for the platform’s disclosure of tax-related information has a relatively little impact on the willingness of cloud manufacturers for knowledge interaction. (3)Network externalities have a positive impact on the strategic choices of cloud manufacturing platforms, cloud providers, and the government. Among these, the influence on cloud providers adopting knowledge interaction strategies is the most significant.

Key words: cloud manufacturing platform, collaborative supervision, knowledge interaction, evolutionary game

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